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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the pertinent strike
law as it developed under the National Labor .Relations Act; and also
to attempt to establish a perspective of the problems that confronted
the National Labor Relations Board and the courts in the interpretation
and application of the National Labor Relations Act when a strike ensued.
The scope of this thesis does not permit, nor does it pretend,
to give an extensive and comprehensive treatment of the strike law under
the National Labor Relations Act. At best, only certain features of
this topic can be dwelled upon.
The National Labor Relations Act had as its objective the
protection of the employees in the right to organize without interference
by employers and in the right to bargain collectively with the employer
through representatives of their own choosing. Employees have gone on
strike for various reasons. Whether a strike was legal or not under the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board and
the Federal Courts were called upon to decide. Since the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1S35 many decisions have been rendered
by the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Courts. A body
of oa se law, interpreting the National Labor Relations Act, is now
available. It should serve as a guiding light for the future consideration
of strike law under Federal and state statutes.
Strikes in our interdependent economy are costly to every seg-
ment of our society. Whether the National Labor Relations Act has been
effective in reducing industrial unrest and strikes is a moot question
because one would have to know what the results would have been without
•.
•
•
.
the National Labor Relations Act during the period of the National Labor
Relations Act’s existence to make a fair comparison. Charts 1 and 2,
shown herein, which cover the period 1935 to 1946, during which the
National Labor Relations Act was in effect, demonstrate that the strike
problem is still with us. No one can deny the fact that industrial
harmony is something we all seek, but which we do not have.
Chapter I deals, in a brief way, with the National Labor
Relations Act’s purpose, constitutionality and the National Labor
Relations Board. This chapter is intended to serve as a background of
the discussion to follow.
Chapter II deals with the right of labor to go on strike. It
is apparent to the student of law and to the student of the labor move-
ment that a right must be legally recognized if it is to be exercised,
that the legal recognition of the right to strike is of tremendous
importance because without it the National Labor Relations Act and the
labor movement would have been ineffective. A strike is labor’s most
effective weapon. Its threat is the strongest bargaining power labor
brings to the collective bargaining conference.
Chapter III deals with strike cases under the National Labor
Relations Act. The Act was designed to eliminate the obstructions to
interstate commerce by strikes. Many articles and books have been written in an
attempt to interpret the intent of Congress in passing this Act. The
extent and scope of this thesis does not permit the detailed analysis and
consideration of all the strike cases under the Act. However, it was
decided that some of the strike cases had to be considered in order to
fully understand and appreciate the problems faced by the National Labor
.'
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Relations Board and the Federal Courts. Therefore, certain cases were
selected and are considered to demonstrate the manner in which the strike
cases were handled by the Board and the courts. Some of the cases begin
with the Board and are taken to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
and then to the United States Supreme Court. Others go as far as the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals and still others go only as far
as the National Labor Relations Board.
As one reads through these cases and the treatment accorded
them by the Board and the courts, one realizes that they were not
problems easily solved nor were the points of view expressed by the
arbiters in compromise. In some instances it appears that the viewpoint
of the dissenting arbiter is as good and as valid as the majority.
Chapter IV deals with Industrial Disputes. An attempt is
made to ascertain the cause for industrial disputes and to point out
that much depends upon the proper understanding of the new relationship
created by recent labor law, both statutory and case law, and the
proper use of the instrument of collective bargaining. Moreover, certain
aspects of the problem of industrial disputes are considered in order
to enable the reader to better appreciate the real nature of the problem
and its far-reaching ramifications.
i
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I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1945
A* Purpose of the Act
The National Labor Relations Act (commonly known as the Wagner
Act) (49 U.S. Statute 449) enacted by Congress and signed by President
Roosevelt on July 5, 1935 represents the culmination of the efforts of
labor to attain the legal right to organize into unions and to bargain
collectively with the employers.
It should be realized that the National Labor Relations Act is
not an all embracing labor relations statute. It has a limited purpose;
namely, to protect employees against employer interference with their
right to form and join labor unions and to encourage collective
bargaining between employers and bargaining agents representing a majority
of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. The Act provides ma-
chinery for the selection and designation of bargaining agents and
declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with the organizational activities of his employees, to dominate or
interfere with their labor organizations, to discriminate against
employees because of their membership in labor organizations and to refuse
to bargain with their designated bargaining representatives.
Prior to the National Labor Relations Act the courts were hostile
to the right of labor to organize. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (26 U.S.
Statute 209) was mis construed by the courts and made to apply to labor
organizations. The Sherman Act provided that all combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade were illegal and punishable. The
background of this Act clearly demonstrates that it was intended to
apply against the rise of trusts and industrial combines, which were
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2employing monopolistic practices to the detriment of th9 general public.
It was enacted to curb big business not the labor unions, which at that
time were neither big nor powerful. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court, in complete disregard of the intent of Congress, applied
the Act in a series of cases, to labor unions. The injunction was
employed by the Federal Courts against labor and did much to hinder
labor’s right to organize and to bargain collectively.
Even the Clayton Act (38 U. S. Statute 730) was misconstrued
by the courts and labor suffered another defeat. The effect of the
United States Supreme Court cases emasculated the Clayton Act. The
Clayton Act stipulated that union activities were not to be enjoined by
the courts, that the provisions of the Sherman Act did not apply.
However, the United States Supreme Court narrowly construed the employer-
employee clause to mean only the employees of the employer involved in
the dispute. Thus only a small group vras protected from Federal
injunctions. Again this was contra to the general intent of Congress.
In due time labor’s right to organize without interference by
the courts or by the employer became established. The National
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 (section 7a) was an attempt to
grant employees the right to self-organization. Also the Norri s-LaGuardia
Act (47 U. S. Statute 70) of March 23, 1932 was successful in restricting
the use of injunctions by the Federal Courts. This Act explicitly
defined labor disputes in section 13(c) so that the United States Supreme
Court could not by judicial gymnastics, as it did with the Clayton Act,
defeat the intent of Congress. The pertinent sections of the Norris- La
Guardian Act regarding this restriction and also regarding the public
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policy of the United States Government are as follows:
"Be it enacted "by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled. That no court of the United
States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or per-
manent injunction in a case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute..*
"Sec. 2. In the interpretation of this
Act and in determining the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts of the United -tates, as
such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined
and limited, the public policy of the United States
is hereby declared as follows:
"Whereas under prevailing economic
conditions, developed with the aid of governmental
authority for owners of property to organize in the
corporate and other forms of ownership association,
the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless
to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain accept-
able terms and conditions of aiployment, wherefore,
though he should be free to decline to associate with
his fellow's, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association, self-organizati on, and desig-
nation of representatives of bis own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment,
and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following
definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States are
hereby enacted. .
•
"Sec. 13 (c) The term "labor dispute"
includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee. "
The National Labor Relations Act clearly presented the problem

confronting the -whole field of labor relations by stating in Section 1
"The denial by employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by employers
tc accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes end other forms of industrial strife
or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce."
Thus we see that the United States government recognized that
industrial unrest was due in part to the fact that employers denied
the employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively with
the employers. Therefore, the government, using its interstate
commerce power declared it to be its policy, in order to eliminate
industrial unrest, to encourage collective bargaining and to protect
the workers in organizing themselves. Section 1 of the National Labor
Relations Act stated the policy of the government to be:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid of protection."
The National Labor Relations Act, in the final analysis, has
as its goal industrial peace. The principle is enunciated that if
workers are given the right to organize into unions without the
interference by employers and if the workers have the right to negotiate
the terms of employment with their employers, this will reduce or elimi-
nate industrial unrest. By encouraging collective bargaining it was
hoped that industrial peace would be achieved.
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The government further recognized that management was in a
relatively powerful economic position and that the individual employees,
as individuals, were economically helpless and so were at the mercy of
management. That because of this inequality in bargaining power,
industrial disputes ensued. Consequently, the policy of the government
was to help equalize the economic power of each group so that collective
bargaining could be entered into by the two groups, each one respecting
the rights and power of the other; and thus be obliged to give due
consideration to the demands of the other. Section 1 of the Act which
deals with this phase of the government’s policy reads as follows;
"The inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of associa-
tion or actual liberty of contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
"Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as
to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and
by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees."
Thus, at long last, we see established the legal right in the
National Labor Relations Act of workers to organize in order to
negotiate with the employers. This means that interference with this
right is illegal, just as the interference with any other legal right
X*
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is illegal. The law of the land sanctioned the right of labor to
engage in self-organization. This was indeed a radical change from
the early days when union activity was termed as criminal conspiracy
and as such enjoined by the courts.
B. Constitutionality of the Act
The National Labor Relations Act derives its constitutionality
from the fact that it seeks to "eliminate the cause of certain substan-
tial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions, 1/
The Constitution of the United States provides "The Congress
shall have the Power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 2/
Thus we note that the constitutional requirement that Congress
shall exercise only those powers expressly granted to it is satisfied
by the objective of the Act. This matter was adjudicated before the
United States Supreme Court and the Act was found constitutional. Z/
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in a series of
cases over a period of years has construed the interstate commerce
clause so that it applies to almost any situation which affects inter-
state commerce, even though it be of a local matter. In a recent case
the United States Supreme Court said;
1/ Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Zj Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
3/ N.L.R.B. vs Jones & Laughton Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1.
{.
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"Fundamental principle is that the power
to regulate commerce is itie power to enact all
appropriate legislation for its ’protection and
advancement *..... .to adopt measures to ’promote its
growth and insure its safety ’to foster, pro-
tect, control, and restrain’ That power is
plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate
commerce no matter what the source of the dangers
which threaten it. Although activities may be
intrastate in character, when separately considered,
if they have such a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce that their control is essen-
tial or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions. Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control." \J
C. National Labor Relations Board
By virtue of the National Labor Relations Act, a National
Labor Relations Board was created. 2/ The Board is designated and
authorized to carry out the provisions of the Act. Whenever the
Board finds that an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice,
it is authorized under Section 10(c) of the Act to issue an order requi
ing him to oeese and desist from such unfair labor practices, and to
take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act.
Remedial orders are issued by the Board to undo the effect of an
unfair labor practice of an employer and also to effectuate the
policies of the Act. If the employer interferes with his employees in
their efforts of self-organization, he is ordered by the Eoard to
cease and desist from such conduct; if the employer is dominating a
1/ N.L. R.B. vs Jones & Laughton Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1.
2
[
Section 3 of the National Labor Relations Act. .
T•
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3labor organization, he is directed to disestablish the dominated
organization; if the employer is discriminating against an employee,
he is ordered to reinstate such employee vdth back pay; if the
employer refuses to bargain with the designated representative of his
employees, he is ordered to do so upon request by the union. In all
these cases the employer is ordered by the Board to post notices in his
plant stating he will comply with the Board’s orders. Further, the
Board can vary or supplement these orders in order to better effectuate
the policies of the Act.
The essence of the Act is contained in its provisions, but
the meaning of those provisions are to be found net in the Act itself
but rather in the many volumes of law developed by the Board and the
United States courts.
The Board has the right to seek the aid of the courts to
compel compliance with its orders and may petition any Circuit Court of
Appeals of the United States for assistance in effecting its orders.
On the other hand, any person aggrieved by the final order of the Eoard
may petition any United States Circuit Court of Appeals and seek redress.
Moreover, the Board is clothed with investigatory powers and
it may issue subpoenas and require the attendance of witnesses.
Violations of the authority of the Board are punishable by fine or
imprisonment, or both.
The Eoard is a quasi- judicial body.
’’The Board dees not act as a mediator or
conciliator. In the statement issued by President
Roosevelt on approving the Act he emphasized that
the National Labor Relations Board will be an
independent quasi- judicial body. ..... Compromise,
i,
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the essence of mediation, has no place in the
interpretation and enforcement of the law.” l/
The policies of the Act are not S6lf- executing. It is for
the Board, created by the Act, to carry out the policies of the Act.
The Board issues orders to effectuate the said policies. Employers
may disregard or disobey the Board’s orders without fear of penalty.
It is only when the courts order the employer to carry out the Board’s
orders that the employer must do so if he is not to be held in contempt
of court.
l/ C.C.H. Labor Law Reports, Volume 1, Section 221
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II. The Right to Strike
A. TMiat is a Strike?
It is either organized or unorganized cessation of work by a
group of workers to induce the employer to grant them their demands.
It is intended to prevent the employer from conducting his business
until he accedes to the demands of the workers. Merely quitting work
in a body with an intention not to return is not considered a strike, l/
The strikers must have the intent to resume work only when their
demands are complied with by the employer. 2/
A strike is a way by which the workers, as a group, match
their economic strength against that of the employer; whereby they
seek to force the employer to accede to their demands. It is an
instrument and a weapon in an economic struggle between employer and
employees as tc the share between them of the joint product of labor
and capital, z/
The right of workers to go on strike and to picket peacefully
to better their conditions does not infringe any right of the employer.
The fact the employer may sustain a loss as a result of the strike under
our social and economic system is considered to be merely the result of
a conflict of interest between capital and labor and, therefore, in the
eyes of the law, is damnum absque injuria. 4{
l/ Jeffrey Deltfitt Insulator Co. vs NLRB 91 Fed. (2d) 134.
2/ Jennings vs Lee 29 5, federal 561.
Zj American Steel Foundsries vs Tri. City Council 257 U.S. 184.
4/ Damnum absque injuria means damage without wrongdoing.
United Chain Theatres vs M.P.M.O. Union 50 Federal (2d) 189.
*.
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B. When is a Strike Legal?
For a strike to be legal, the strikers must act in good faith
in striking for a lawful purpose and must employ lawful means.
In the final analysis a strike is the manifestation of a labor
dispute. A labor dispute has been defined as any controversy concerning
the terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment. 1/ There may
be a valid dispute even where the disputants do not stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee. 2/ Labor disputes fall
into four categories.
1. Those caused by conflicting interpretations, or the
general nonobservance of the terms of a collective labor agreement;
2. Those concerning the terms and conditions of the
employment, as wages, hours, working rules and the like, if they are
not already agreed upon and included in a contract between the employer
and the workers;
3. Jurisdictional disputes or controversies between two or
more unions as to which of them shall have jurisdiction over certain
kinds of work; and
4. Disputes concerning the rights of workers to organize and
to bargain collectively with their employer, including such incidental
issues as protest against discrimination for union activity, and like
1/ Donnelly Garment Co. vs I.L.G.W. Union, 20 Fe d. Supp. 767.
2 New Negro Alliance vs Sanitary Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 542.
..
matters. 1/
The purpose of a strike must be lawful* Strikers picketing
for unlawful purposes are beyond any lawful sanction. 2f Where the
object of a strike or picketing is unlawful, all acts in support thereof
are unlawful and will be restrained. In order that the purpose of a
strike be considered legal, it must be a strike about matters which are
vital to the welfare of the workers, such as wages, hours, conditions
of employment or as to who shall speak for employees in negotiating
and arranging the terms and conditions of employment. One of the
disputants demands something by way of emprovement of wages and condi-
tions and the other refuses the demand. Z/
The means used in a strike must be lawful. Whenever in the
conduct of a strike or picketing illegal means are used in support
thereof, such as intimidations, threats, or violence, the strike or
picketing becomes unlawful, at least until those illegal means are
discontinued. If during a strike unlawful injuries are inflicted, the
union is liable* The unlawful seizure and retention of employer’s
property by the striking employees was held to be using unlawful means,
and so was good cause for the strikers discharge notwithstanding the
National Labor delations Act* Zj
1/ Donnelly Garment Co. vs Int. Union, 20 Fed. Supp. 767.
2/ Senn vs Tile Layers' Union, 301 U. S. 469.
3/ Donnelly Garment C 0 . vs Int. Union, 20 Fe d. Suppl. 767.
4/ U. M. Workers of America vs Colorado Coal Co., 42 Supreme Ct. 570.
5/ National Labor ^lations Board vs Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.
306 U. S. 240.

A strike having as its purpose higher wages, shorter hours or
improved working conditions is considered an economic strike -wherein
the workers as a group match their economic strength as against that
of the eiaployer. Such a strike is to be distinguished from an unfair
labor practice strike under the National Labor Relations Act. An
unfair labor practice strike under the National Labor Relations Act
contemplates the situation where the employer commits an unfair labor
practice to the detriment of the workers. The workers can go on
strike to force the employer to discontinue his unfair labor practice;
and also can petition the National Labor Relations Board to order the
employer to cease and desist from such a practice.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act covers unfair
labor practices committed by the employer and it reads as follows:
"it shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer —
"1. To interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7.
”2. To dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other
support to it. . .
•
"3. By discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization....
"4. To discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this Act.
"5. To refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of Section 9 (a). M
..
'
....
....
.
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The term "labor dispute" as defined by the National Labor
Relations Act has a wide scope. The National Labor Relations Act
provides in Section 2(9):
"The term * labor dispute* includes any
controversy concerning terms, tenure, or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."
C. Types of Strikes
In the old days, workers would quit work and set up a picket
line. This is the usual procedure employed today. However, some
innovations have been introduced. We now have strikes like the
following:
1. Sit-down strike, considered illegal in the United
States
.
2. Jurisdictional strikes, where two unions are fighting
it out for the right to represent the employees, and the employer is
caught in between.
3. Sympathetic strikes, where a union not involved in any
controversy with its employer goes on strike in sympathy for a fellow
union on strike in an attempt to pressure its own employer not to deal
with the employer whose workers are on strike; and thus place an economic
burden on the employer whose workers are on strike.
4. "Wildcat strikes, where the workers go on strike without
authorization of the union
-:
.
.
*
*
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5. Flesh strikes, which are of short duration spreading
from department to department,
6. Quit strikes, where the workers quit for an hour, go back
to work for an hour, then quit again for an hour, etc.
7. Political strikes, where the workers have no grievance
against the employer but are demonstrating against the government.
D. The Historical Development of the Right to Strike
The courts, which reflect the mores of a society at any given
time, (even though they are slow to adjust to changes in the mores)
declared in the early part of the eighteenth century, when industrialism
made its entrance into the economic life of the people of the United
States, that a combination of workers the purpose of which was to
secure a raise in wages was illegal, l/ In other words, the right to
combine into unions and the right to strike were not sanctioned.
These rights had no legal validity. Convictions of combination of
workers on the grounds of criminal conspiracy were frequent.
An Early decision, recognizing the right of workers to
combine for the purpose of bettering labor conditions, was handed
down by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in 1842. However, this decision, and a few others like it, was not
a definite turning por'nt for the advent and legal recognition of
labor’s right to combine into unions and the establishment of the
right to strike. It represented merely the decision of a state ahead
1/ Cordwainer's Case, Pa.j 1806 Mayor’s Court, Philadelphia.
2/ Com. vs Hunt, 4 Metcalf 111.
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of its time. A long and costly struggle was still ahead for the
workers before they would receive the right to strike. In a famous
United States Supreme Court case in 1895 the United States
Supreme Court declared that equity courts could be resorted to by
employers to obtain relief in labor controversies by means of the
injunction. This was a real setback for labor because as soon as
workers would go on strike in an attempt to receive higher wages and to
improve working conditions, the employer would have them enjoined by
the Federal Courts where a federal matter was involved.
Later decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
both federal Z/ and state 4{ anti-injunction legislation now limit
any resort to equitable relief in "labor disputes" and since the
terms "labor disputes" are broadly defined, it is extremely difficult
for the Federal Courts and the State Courts to procure the jurisdiction
needed to issue injunctions.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act circumscribed and limited the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over industrial disputes affecting
commerce so much so that the Federal Courts were practically powerless
to issue injunctions where strikes ensued, liany of the states passed
statutes modelled after the Norris-LaQuardia Act.
Legal recognition of the right to strike is of tremendous
importance. It represents society’s acceptance of this right; and
1/ In re Debs (1895) 158 U. S. 564.
2/ Recent case: U. S. vs Hutcheson et al (1941) 312 U. S. 219.
z/ Norri s-LaGuardia Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Clayton Act.
i/ Usually modelled after the Federal Statutes.
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therefore it cannot be interfered with, providing it is employed for
a legal purpose and in a legal manner.
The right to strike is recognized almost universally today.
It is guaranteed in numerous court decisions and statutes, both
federal l/ and state. However, it is not immune from regulation and
restriction, anymore, for example, than the right of free speech or
religious freedom. The effect of strikes upon the public interest runs
through labor cases and legislation. This right is circumscribed by
requiring that the strike be:
1. for a lawful purpose,
2. conducted in a lawful manner,
3. does not affect the public interest to the
point where the general welfare is at stake.
An essential part of the strike technique is picketing. To
say labor has the right to strike is of no real consequence unless the
right to picket is also recognized. Picketing is the means by which
the right to strike is made effective. Picketing can be peaceful or
violent. Only peaceful picketing is lawful. In recent times picketing
has been considered a form of "freedom of speech" which is guaranteed
by the First Amendment and protected against state infringement by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In a series of
cases the United States Supreme Court has ruled that anti-picketing
legislation violates free speech guarantees where there is no violence
and where the picketing follows the product so as to meet the unity of
l/ National Labor -Relations Act, Section 13.
Thornvill vs Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940. Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 802, International Brotherhood of Teamsters vs.
Wohl, 312 U.S. 658 (1941).
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interest test
One of the most important chapters on strike law, in its
national scope, has been -written under the Federal anti-trust laws.
Specifically these laws are: the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Clayton
Act, and the Norris- La Guardi a Act. Regarding the Clayton Act, Chief
Justice Taft said,
"Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton
Act as legal when instituted for mutual help and
lawfully carrying out their legitimate object. They
have long been thus recognized by the courts....
Unions. . .were withholding their labor of economic
value to make him (employer) pay what they thought
it was worth. The right to combine for such a
lawful purpose has in many years not been denied
by any court."
E. The Right to Strike Under the National Labor Relations Act
Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act specifically
provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." By this provision.
Congress recognized the right to strike -- that employees could
lawfully cease work at their own volition because of the failure of
the employer to meet their demands. Under the Act the employees have
the right to strike for good cause or no cause provided the strike is
conducted in a lawful manner. A labor union may attempt to increase the
number of its members, unionize an employer's business, protest against
unfair labor practices, and seek to further the interests of the union
among the employees by calling a strike, by lawful picketing or other
1/ American Steel Foundaries vs Tri-City Central Trades Council et al
257 U. S. 184 (1921).
.....
.
.
‘V
.
V
’
'
’
•
•
!
r
. .
lawful means
The Act makes it clear that it was not intended to restrict
in any way the right to strike. The framers of the Act went out of
their way to explicitly protect labor’s right to strike. They didn’t
want to take any chances and so by Section 13 made it so clear that no
one could possibly misconstrue their real intent.
The courts have held that employees have the right to strike
under the Act, 1/ Section 13 is so explicit that the courts could
not possibly ignore it or by-pass it by legal gymnastics. The policy
reason for this section has been explained as follows:
"In view of these characteristics of the
Act, one might winder why it was felt necessary to
provide expressly that the Act was not intended
’to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, ’ The reason appears on
examination of two other features of the Act.
First, one of the basic features of the Act is,
avowedly, to minimize industrial unrest end conflict
(Section l). Since strikes are the most apparent
sign of industrial unrest, it might have been
thought, had Section 13 not been included, that
judges should view strikes in conflict with the
basic policy of the Act. The consequence of such
a judicial view: might, especially in cases involving
strikes tainted wdth some degree of illegality,
have worked at odds with the Act’s generally
liberal attitude toward employee rights." 2/
And in Section 7, the Act provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
”
1/ N. L. R. B. vs Remington Rand, 94 Fed. (2d) 862.
2/ C. C. H. Reporter Section 5341.
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This section is designed not only to provide that employees
shall have the right to organize into unions but, also, shall have the
right "to engage in concerted activities." This is another way of
saying that they shall have the right to strike. It is apparent that
it is the purpose of the Act to protect employees engaged in concerted
activities, including strikes.
Moreover, in Section 2(3), the Act provides:
"The term 'employee’ shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment...."
This section is designed to protect the striker who has gone
on strike because of a current labor dispute or because of an unfair
labor practice. It enables such e striker to be considered in the eyes
of tKe law an employee of the employer; and thus to enable him to
retain the rights he is entitled to as an employee so long as the
labor dispute is current. These rights may be for back pay, reinstate-
ment and immunities against discrimination. The statute would
largely fail of its purpose if an employer could, in the presence of
a strike, rid himself of the duty to negotiate by refusing to recognize
as employees those failing to return to work on his terms. \J They
are entitled to reinstatement according to the following rules*
1. If the strike is the result of an unfair labor practice
by the employer, the strikers are entitled to reinstatement, even if
1/ Jeffrey CeTCitt Co. vs N.L.R.E. 91 Fed. (2d) 134.
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the employer hired replacements. The Board can order the strikers
reinstated with or without back pay. The Board, usually, will not
order back pay, even though the strike results from an unfair labor
practice, because of the reason thst the strikers chose to exercise
their right to strike rather than use the facilities of the Board for
the adjustment of the alleged unfair labor practice. l/ However, back
pay wi.ll be awarded from the time the employer refuses to comply with
the Board's order to reinstate the strikers, or vbere the Eoard feels
it can best effectuate the policies of the Act.
Where the strike is caused by an unfair labor practice,
the Board has ruled that the strikers continue to be employees not
only during the strike but after the strike has ended. And unless the
strikers obtain "equivalent employment" elsewhere, they are eligible
for reinstatement at normal wages extending back to the date when the
employer has refused to obey the order of the Board to reinstate them.
Where an employer refuses to reemploy strikers who struck
because of an unfair labor practice, and who are not guilty of serious
acts of violence, this is violation of Section 8(3) which reads, "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition to....”
where positions are available or could be made available by the
discharge of strike replacements. 2/
Where the strike is caused or prolonged by the employer's
1/ N.L.R.E. vs Remington Rand Ino., 94 Fed. (2d) 862.
2/ N.L.R.E. vs Greater N.Y. Broadcasting, 147 Fed. (2d) 337.
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unfair labor practice, the employer must reinstate the strikers, even
though the replacement employees must be dismissed to make room for
them. Also, these striking employees may not be displaced by other
employees for the purpose of losing to the union its majority so long
as the strike is conducted legally. There is a presumption of a
majority until it is challenged in good faith. 1/ If the employer
attaches any condition to the reinstatement of such strikers, it has
been held he has refused to reinstate them. 2/
2. Strikes not caused by the employer's unfair labor practice
are to be distinguished from those discussed above. They are referred
to as ’’economic” strikes. An economic strike is defined as one not
caused nor prolonged by an unfair labor practice of the employer.
In such strikes, the employer may hire strike replacements
in order to continue operations. And, the replacement employees may
be retained after the strike is over, since the employer is under
no duty to let them go to make room for the strikers. The employer
violates the Act only if he refuses to reinstate the strikers because
of their strike activity although positions are available. 3/ Thus
we see that economic strikers possess a relatively qualified right to
be reinstated.
For purposes of the Act economic strikers remain employees so
long as the strike is current and operations have not returned to normal.
1/ Standard Lime & Stone Co. vs N.L.R.E., 97 Fed. (2d) 531. N.L.R.B. vs
Fansteel Corp., 306 U.S. 240. N.L.R.E. vs Remington Rand, 94 Fed. (2d) 862.
2/ Polish National Alliance vs N.L.R.E., 136 Fed. (2d) 175.
y N.L.R.E. vs Mackey Radio and Telegraph Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 333.
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If during the course of an economic strike the employer
replaces the striking employees with other employees so that the strik-
ing union is no longer the representative of a majority of his
employees, his duty to bargain disappears because the duty to bargain
continues only so long as the striking union is the proper representative
of a majority of his employees in the proper unit. 1/
The Act does not protect strikers engaged in unlawful
activities. The Supreme Court held that sit-down strikers were not
entitled to reinstatement, that such a strike was not the exercise of
the right to strike to which the Act refers. 2/ "Where there is no
strike clause in a labor contract, it must be complied with just as
any other provision in the contract. "bj Employees who engaged in a
strike for recognition where a rival union had been certified found
themselves not afforded the protection of the Act. 4/
The conclusion one can draw from Section 13 and other
pertinent sections of the Act relating to the right to strike is that
this right was not to be restricted or denied to labor; and it was to
be fortified and protected so long as it is a lawful strike. The
courts went along with this apparent conclusion; and also enunciated
the principle that the right to strike, before and after the Act, had
to be a lawful one if the benefits of the Act were to apply.
y N.L.R.B. vs Mackey Radio, 304 U.S. 333.
2/ N.L.R.B. vs Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240.
2/ N.L.R.B. vs Columbia Enameling and Stamping Co. 96 Fed. (2d) 984.
Matter of Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc. 72 N.L.R.B. 445; N.L.R.B. vs
Sands Mgr. Co. 306 U.S. 332.
Matter of Thompson Products, Inc. 72 N.L.R.B. 886.
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In determining whet is a legal or illegal strike is of major
importance because by the simple device of finding most strikes
unlawful the courts and the Board, if they were so disposed, could have
undermined the intent and purpose of the Act. By declaring a strike
unlawful, the employer could discharge the strikers. This is a most
effective weapon an employer can use against strikers because then the
strikers, not being employees, have no rights under the Act. Where
strikers are determined to be employees, they have the right to be
reinstated and receive back pay where the strike is the result of an
unfair labor practice. Also, where the strikers are considered employees,
they are entitled to immunity against discrimination.
However, both the United States Courts and the Board went
through a series of cases wherein they arrived at what is considered
a fair set of rules as to what constitutes an illegal strike. The
Fansteel doctrine 1/ stands for the proposition that a sit-down strike,
where the strikers seized the employer's property, is an illegal strike;
and thus is a good cause for the discharge of the strikers notwithstanding
the Act. The court stated in this case that the Act does not undertake
to abrogate the right of an employer to refuse to retain in his employ
those who illegally take and hold possession of his property. Also,
the court went a step further and said even if the strike is the result
of an unfair labor practice of the employer, the strikers, nevertheless,
do not have the right to unlawfully take over the employer’s property.
In applying the Fansteel doctrine, the Board made the wise
1/ N.L.R.E. vs Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 306 U.S. 240
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decision of drawing the line between acts of violence and acts of
minor misconduct by strikers. It held that this doctrine does not
apply to strikers who engage in only minor misconduct and picket line
disorders. Also, the Board in a series of cases involving the
Stabilization Act (National War Labor Board) and the War Labor
Disputes Act was loathed to call a strike unlawful because it
realized only too well that every time a strike was found unlawful,
the strikers were no longer considered employees and so lost the
protection and benefits of the Act. In these cases the Board refused
to call a strike unlawful unless the pertinent Federal Act left no
alternative or unless the case represented one of serious violence or
bad faith on the part of the union.
F. Settling Strikes
There are various methods of settling strikes.
The judicial remedies have been curbed considerably. The
remedy of criminal prosecution for illegal conspiracy has been discarded.
The equitable remedies by way of injunction are subject to much
limitation. 1/ Under the National Labor Relations Act where there is
a strike for an unfair labor practice, the employer cannot seek
redress from the courts. The reason for curbing considerably the
judicial remedies is that the people, through the government, have
come to realize that the courts are not properly equipped to handle a
strike situation; which, in the final analysis, is an economic struggle
1/ Norris LaOuardia Act
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and not one that can be best resolved by resorting to legal niceties*
Also, it has become the accepted theory that since a strike is an
economic struggle, the courts should not take side with one of the
disputants so long as legal means are employed. However, the courts
have taken an active part in cases of violence, disorderly conduct,
breach of peace or where the purpose of the strike was deemed illegal.
Collective bargaining, sponsored by the National Labor Relations
Act and state laws, is an attempt to understand the labor problem and
an attempt to reach a solution without the need of going through a
costly strike. This is the method commonly employed today; and on it
much depends upon the future harmony between capital and labor.
Also, mediation, conciliation and arbitration are methods
employed to settle strikes
1
1
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III. Strike Cases Under The National Labor Relations Act
A. Strike Defined
C. G. Conn, Limited vs National Labor Relations Board is a case
that came up through the National Labor Relations Board (10 N.L.R. B.
498, 1938) to the ^ruted States Circuit Court of Appeals (108 Federal
2nd 390).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The corporation had a busy period during September, October,
November, and the early part of December of each year. During these
months the employees of Department 33 (Polishing Department) worked an
*
average of 57g hours per week, including overtime on four nights of
each week. Overtime was anything in excess of 48 hours per week.
On the evening of October 14th the employees refused to work
overtime without being paid for it. They left at 6 P.L. The next day
the corporation asked the said employees to sign a statement in which
they were to agree to work overtime without pay, as had been the case in
the past. Those who refused to sign were laid off, and the corporation
hired replacements. Later, most of the discharged employees were asked
to return to work with the understanding that they were not to receive
any overtime. They accepted and so returned to work. However, six
men were refused reinstatement, even though they were willing to return
to wrork without overtime. The corporation discharged some of the
replacement employees, except those they needed to replace the six old
employees it had refused reinstatement.
The Board found that on October 14 the employees engaged in a
concerted protest against the prevailing practice of not being paid for
overtime. This concerted activity amounted to a strike, as the employees
refused to work over 48 hours per w^eek. Therefore, since the employees
,
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were striking employees they retained the status as employees, and the
corporation's efforts to discharge them were inoperative. The Board
found that the corporation in refusing to reinstate the aforesaid six
employees discriminated against them because of their concerted activities,
and not because their places had been filled, or because they were
inefficient, or otherwise unsuitable employees. hence, by refusing to
reinstate them, the corporation had discriminated in regard to hire and
tenure of employment in violation of the Act. The Board ordered the
corporation to cease and desist from discouraging its employees from
belonging to the union, or in any manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce its employees in their right to self-organization, and to take
the affirmative action of offering reinstatement with back pay to the
six striking employees who were discriminated against by the corporation.
The majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals was written
by Judge Major with Judge Tresnor concurring. The majority opinion held
that the employees were not strikers, hence, were net employees under
the Act. That the definitions of the word "strike" are all substantially
alike. It gave the following as the definition of a strikes
"The term strike is applied commonly to a
combined effort on the part of a body of workmen
employeed by the same master to enforce a demand
for higher wages, shorter hours, or some other
concession, by stopping work in a body at a
prearranged time, and refusing to resume work until
the demanded concession shall have been granted."
That the facts of this case do not bring tne discharged
employees within this or any other definition of the word "strike." An
employee cannot be on strike and at work simultaneously. Ee must be on
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a job subject to the authority and control of the employer or off the
job as a striker in support of some grievance. The courts have held
that the employer has a right to discharge men for any reason other
than union activity or concerted action in favor of collective bargaining.
In this case the men were discharged because of their insistence upon
working under their own terms. Therefore, the corporation was within
its rights in discharging the employees, and their status as employees
was thereby destroyed.
Judge Treanor concurred with the result but not with the reasons
of the majority. He held that the employer- employee relation was not
destroyed here by the conduct cf the employees or the act of the employer.
That the cessation of work was the result of a bona fide labor dispute,
but that the layoff of the six employees did not constitute an unfair
labor practice and, consequently, the employer was not precluded from
replacing the men by other workers.
It is my opinion that the decision of the majority opinion,
based as it was on the sound definition of a strike, represents the best
possible solution to a problem like this. Employees are either working
or on strike, for purposes of the Act. To try half measures will unduly
complicate matters and not serve the cause of either labor or management.
Grievances of employees are common occurences. Unless the
employees cease work entirely to compel the employer to do something about
their grievances, they should not consider themselves on strike. Refusal
to do part of the work, or as in this case to refuse to work overtime,
is insubordination of the authority of the employer, not a strike.
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Economic Strike
The National Labor Relations Board vs Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Corporation case came up through the Rational Labor Relations
Board (l N.L.R.B. 201, 1936) to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
(87 Federal 2nd 611) to the United States Supreme Court (304 U.S. 333).
The facts of this case are as follows:
The employees of the corporation tried to negotiate with the
corporation terms and conditions of employment but failed. Thereupon,
the employees went on strike. The corporation brought employees from
its offices in other cities to take the place of the strikers. The
strike failed and, subsequently, all but five of the strikers were
reemployed by the corporation.
Proceeding was had before the National Labor Relations Board
upon a complaint against the corporation charging that its nonemploy-
ment of the five strikers was a discrimination against them on account
of their union activities and that therefore the corporation was guilty
of unfair labor practices under the Act. The corporation denied this
allegation maintaining that the strikers were refused reinstatement
because there were no vacancies in the kind of work they did when they
applied*
The Board concluded that by refusing to reinstate the five
striking employees, the corporation thereby discharged said employees
and by such discharge discriminated in regards to their tenure of
employment. It said that even if assuming that the corporation was
entitled to retain the employees who were transferred from other cities
(the Board called them strikebreakers) and that such retention was not
a discrimination within the meaning of Section 8(3), nevertheless a
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choice based upon discrimination for union membership or activities
is unlawful. The Board pointed out that the corporation refused
reinstatement to the leaders of the union and that this choice was made
because of their activities in the union. The National Labor Relations
Board ordered the corporation to cease and desist from unfair labor
practices and required the corporation to reinstate the employees in
their former position with back pay.
As permitted by the Act, the Board filed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals a transcript of the records of its proceedings and
a petition for enforcement of its order. The majority opinion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals was written by Judge Wilbur with Circuit Judge
Matthew writing a concurring opinion.
The majority opinion is based upon the thesis that the Act, in
so far as it attempts to force upon an employer engaged in interstate
commerce a contract of employment, is unconstitutional because it violates
the Fifth Amendment, The majority opinion held that the contract of
employment between the corporation and the striking employees had
terminated and that, therefore, Congress cannot say that it was not
terminated by simply providing in the National Labor Relations Act that
employees, who go on strike as a result of a labor dispute or unfair
labor practice, remain employees as long as the strike is current.
The concurring opinion written by Circuit Judge Matthews boils
down to this: That the National Labor Relations Act defines an employee
to include a person whose work has ceased as a consequence or in
connection with any current labor dispute; that in this case the strike
was not called because of a labor dispute but because negotiations
..
.
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failed and, therefore, the strikers are not to be considered employees
within the meaning of the Act. The Board, according to him, in ordering
the corporation to cease and desist, exceeded its authority because the
strikers did not remain employees within the meaning of the Act.
Circuit Court Judge Garrecht wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he held that the Board acted within its statutory authority. He
said that the evidence is convincing that the five employees were
discharged by the corporation because of their union activities. He
disagreed with the majority opinion. He quoted many cases and instances
to show that the freedom of contract and the freedom of property rights
are not absolute but are to be regulated where the general welfare is
involved; that the guarantee of due process merely demands that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious; that the Act
doss not interfere with the right of an employer to select its employees
or to discharge them but is designed to prevent him from interfering
with the rights of employees to organize themselves into effective
unions and to be members thereof.
The Supreme Court held that the facts show that the strike was
a consequence of or in connection with a current labor dispute as defined
in Section 2(9) of the Act; that there is no evidence of an unfair
labor practice as defined in Section 8 of the Act, but within the intent
of the Act there was an existing labor dispute regarding wages, terms,
and conditions of employment, and as a result thereof, a strike was called.
The Supreme Court pointed out that although Section 13 of the
Act provides that nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, it
.
.
.
'
.
.
r>.
if
.
.
.
V
.
!
does not follow that an employer guilty of no act denounced by the
statute has lost the right to protect and continue his business by
supplying places left vacant by strikers; and the employer is not
bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of the strikers upon
the election of the latter to return to work.
But, said the Supreme Court, the claim put forward in this
case is that the unfair labor practices by the employer was discrimina-
tion in reinstating striking employees by keeping out certain of them
for the sole reason that they were active in the union; that since the
strikers retained under the Act the status of employees, any such
discrimination in putting them back to work is prohibited by Section 8;
that the Board’s findings as to discrimination are supported by the
evidence because the employer prepared and used a list, and the action
taken by the employer, in view of the list, was with the purpose to
discriminate against those most active in the union.
This case defines an economic striker. An economic striker,
according to this case, is one who goes on strike not because of an
unfair labor practice as defined by the Act, but because he is demanding
improvement in his wages, terms, and conditions of employment. So long
as the strike remains current, the strikers remain employees of the
employer, and although they are not entitled to reinstatement as in the
case of strikers who go on strike because of an unfair labor practice,
nevertheless they are entitled not to be discriminated against. The
employer who is not guilty of an unfair labor practice has a right to
replace striking employees in order to keep his business going, and he
need not rehire the strikers upon the completion of the strike. However,
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if he decides to rehire any of the strikers, he must not discriminate
against any one of them. It appears the t the National Labor Relations
Board hit the nail on the head by pointing out that even assuming that
the new employees could be retained, nevertheless in rehiring the striking
employees the employer could not discriminate against those most active
in the union. The Supreme Court took the same position as the Board*
The majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals was too
legalistic. It failed to take into consideration the point brought out
by its dissenting justice; namely, that contract rights are not absolute.
As the dissenting opinion pointed out, the Act does not interfere with
the rights of the employer to hire and to fire, but it does prevent the
employer from committing unfair labor practices.
This case demonstrates the many angles from which this problem
was considered. On the one hand the employer's rights to continue
operations were safeguarded, in view of the fact that he had not
engaged in any unfair labor practices. Also, the rights of the striking
employees were protected from discrimination because of union activities.
All in all this case is an excellent example of a sincere attempt to
balance the equities so that both parties involved will be given a fair
chance. The majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals almost
beclouded the real issues, but both the Board and the Supreme Court got
to the very crux of the matter and rendered an admirable decision.
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Unfair Labor Practice Strike
Aluminum Products Company case came up through the National
Labor Relations Board (7 N.L.R.B. 1219) to the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals (120 Federal 2nd 567).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The employees organized into two local unions affiliated with
the A. F. of L. They could not satisfactorily negotiate with the company,
so they went on strike.
The unions and the company entered into a valid contract, and
in pursuance thereof the strike was terminated. Then followed the
reopening of the company’s plants.
The company started its own union to replace the local unions,
and through its representatives it informed the employees that they could
not return to work so long as they remained members of the A. F. of L.
;
that the company would give them a better contract if they withdrew
from the A. F. of L. The company succeeded in getting some employees
to resign from the A. F. of L. unions and to join the company union.
Thereupon, the company organized its own union, and the members of the
A. F. of L. were laid off for not withdrawing from the A. F. of L.
unions and joining the company union.
Moreover, the company's officials and supervisory employees
made statements that carried the necessary implications of attempted
influence. They made known their dislike for the A. F. of L. ; they
advised the employees that the A. F. of L. was interested in receiving
dues; that employees could not return to work if they remained
members of the A. F. of L.j that the employees should not be controlled
by outside organizers and that the A. F. of L. unions were dominated by
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professional agitators.
The National Labor Relations Board ordered the company to cease
and desist from discouraging in any manner membership in any labor
organization or interfering, restraining, or coercing the employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organi zation as provided for by
the Act. The Board also ordered the company to take the following
affirmative action:
1. Withdraw all recognition from the company dominated union
and to disestablish it completely.
2. Offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former
position, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges, to employees who were discharged for belonging to the
A. F. of L. unions.
3. Make whole certain employees for any loss of pay they
suffered by reason of the company’s discrimination in regard to their
hire and tenure of employment.
4. Post notices.
District Judge Lindley wrote the decision for the Circuit
Court of Appeals. This decision points out that in the proceedings under
the National Labor Relations Act the credibility of witnesses is for the
National Labor Relations Board as the trier of facts, not the court. It
said that perhaps other triers of facts would have found differently
as to the causes of these discharges, but it is wholly futile to
speculate upon such contingenci es ; that after careful consideration it
was unable to say that there was a failure of substantial evidence to
support the Board's findings.
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The court got to the crux of the matter by saying that an
employer under the National Labor Relations Act must preserve the utmost
of neutrality so far as the employees' right to organize and to designate
their bargaining agent is concerned. Evidence of statements by the
employer's officers that no work would be available to members of the
A. F. of L. unions and that the employer would not "go along" with such
unions and that the A. F. of L. unions were dominated by professional
agitators, etc., sustained the finding that the employer was guilty of
an unfair labor practice in that he influenced, coerced, and interfered
with the employees' freedom to choose their own bargaining agent. Also,
the court found that the evidence sustained the order of the National
Labor Relations Board, requiring the employer to reinstate with back
pay certain striking employees on the grounds that they had been
discriminated against because of their union activities.
This is a case of an unfair labor practice strike where the
Board exercises its right under the Act to order the employer to cease
and desist from unfair labor practices and to offer full reinstatement
to employees who were discharged for belonging to the unions and to
reinstate with back pay the employees who were discriminated against
because of their union activities. The unfair labor practices of the
employer amounted to this: The employer interfered with, coerced and
restrained his employees in the exercise of their right to organize and
designate a bargaining agent of their own choosing. The employer was
not neutral.
In the case where employees strike because the employer commits
'1
.
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unfair labor practices, such as here, where the employer tried to coerce
his employees to join its own union, the Board and the courts, in
effectuating the Act, require that the status quo that existed before
the unfair labor practices were committed be reestablished; that is,
the Board will order that the strikers be reinstated, and in some
instances the Board will order reinstatement with back pay.
An unfair labor practice strike is to be distinguished from
an economio strike. An economic strike is one where the employees go
on strike to improve their working conditions, hours, or wages. The
employer is not in any way guilty of interfering with their right to
designate their own bargaining agent. It is simply a cas9 where the
employer refuses to accede to the demands of the employees. The rule
laid down in an economic strike, as established by the Mackay case, 1{
is that the strikers take their chance that they might be replaced by
new employees; that so long as they are not discriminated against in the
order in which they are rehired, if they are rehired, they have no rights
to their job; that is, the status quo will not be reestablished in a case
of an economic strike where an employer has hired new employees to take
the jobs of striking employees. Whereas in the case of unfair labor
practice strike the employer must discharge all new employees hired
since the strike and rehire the striking employees.
It is my opinion that the decisions of this case and the Mackay
case were justly rendered. The employer who commits an unfair labor
practice certainly does not deserve the consideration that an employer
of an economic strike deserves. One violates an Act of Congress, the
other merely does not accede to the demands of his employees.
l/ Mackay Radio and Telegraph Corp., 304 U.S. 333.
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D. Unlawful Conduct of Strikers
1. Sit-down Strike
National Labor Relations Board vs Fansteel Metallurgical
Corporation case came up through the National Labor Relations Board
(5 N.L.R.B. 930) to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (98 Federal
2nd 375), then finally to the United States Supreme Court (360 U.S. 240).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The union tried to negotiate with the corporation regarding
rates of pay, hours, and conditions of employment. The corporation
refused to bargain with the union on the grounds that it would not
deal with an "outside” union. The corporation was trying to form a
company union. Thereupon, the employees of the corporation, members
of the union, went on a "sit-down" strike by taking over and holding two
"key" buildings, and thus causing the remainder of the corporation’s
plant to cease operations.
The officials of the corporation notified all sit-down employees
that they were discharged.
The corporation obtained from the State Court an injunction
ordering the men to surrender the plant to the corporation. They refused,
and after two battles with the forces of the sheriff, they were ousted,
placed under arrest, and eventually fined and given jail sentences for
violating the State Court’s order.
The corporation, upon regaining possession, restaffed by
accepting new employees and by accepting only the old employees who were
willing to return without recognition of the union.
This case came up before the Board in the light of the facts
as stated above. The Board was confronted with the problem of whether
or not to order the reinstatement of the striking employees with back pay.
. . .
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On the one hand the Corporation was guilty of* unfair labor practices
(interfering with, restraining, and ooercing its employees in the exercise
of their right to bargain; dominating and interfering with the formation
of their Union; and refusing to bargain collectively with the Union); and
on the other hand the employees used force by means of a sit-down strike
to make the Corporation accede to their demands. The main issue before
the Board was whether or not the reinstatement of the striking employees
with back pay would effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board, in
ordering the reinstatement of the striking employees, used a "clean-hands
doctrine" in arriving at its conclusion. The Board said,
"It is contended that the conduct of the
strikers in engaging in the sit-down strike...
relieves the respondent of any obligation toward
the participants, including those who brought
supplies to the men in the plant. In making this
contention, however, the respondent does not
come before the Board with clean hands." 1/
The Board realised that the clean-hands doctrine could not be
employed in ail these cases where force is used by the striking employees.
It drew the line by saying that where striking employees engaged in
sabotage or engaged in shooting and wounding fellow employees during the
course of a strike, it had declined reinstatement of said striking
employees despite the fact that the strike was caused by the employer*s
unfair labor practices. 2/ and 3/ But the Board pointed out the conduct
of the strikers in the present case is not analogous to the conduct of
strikers where sabotage and shooting takes place. At this point the
Board gives what, apparently,
1/ In the matter of *ansteel Metallurgical Corporation. .. 5 N.L.R.B. 930
2/ In the matter of Kentucky Five-Buck Company. ..3 N.L.R.B. 455
Z/ In the matter of Standard Lime and Stone Company... 5 N.L.R.B. 106
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was its real reason for permitting the order for reinstatement. It said:
"The outstanding fact revealed by this
record is that had it not been for the respondent’s
illegal conduct, the orderly process of collective
bargaining, which the Act is designed to encourage,
would have taken place.” 1/
In other words, the Board's position boils down to this. The
Board was confronted with its own precedent in two cases that had come
up before it where sabotage and shooting had taken place by employees,
and the Board had refused to exercise its power under the Act, in
effectuating the policies of the Act, to reinstate the striking
employees. In this case the Board felt that it was not analogous to
the sabotage and shooting cases. Its reason for deciding that it was
not analogous appears very weak. In fact it gave no reason, except to
arrive at the conclusion that these cases were not analogous to the case
before the Board. Then the Board went on further by pointing out that
apparently the illegal conduct of the corporation prevented the orderly
process of collective bargaining; and that because of this illegal
conduct the strike took place. It does not satisfactorily explain
whether or not the illegal conduct of the two other cases, which it
had before it as a precedent, could be said to have prevented the
orderly process of collective bargaining.
The Board ordered the corporation to cease and desist from
interfering with the right of the employees to self-organization, from
dominating or interfering with the Union of the employees and from
refusing to bargain collectively with said Union. And the Board further
1/ In the matter of Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation... 5 N.L.R.B. 930
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ordered, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, that the
employees, who were discharged for refusing to go back to work without
recognizing the Union, be reinstated with back pay and to post notices
of this fact.
The case then was taken before the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit on July 22, 1938. The majority opinion was voiced by
Judges Sparkes and Lindley. The dissenting opinion wss voiced by Judge
Treanor.
The majority opinion held that the Corporation had a right to
discharge the employees and that the Board was in error Than it ordered
reinstatement. The majority opinion was based on the idea that the
striking employees had violated the law and that the Corporation was
justified in discharging them; and that therefore if the court were to
go along with the Board, it in effect would be condoning the illegal
activities of the striking employees.
The dissenting judge held the position that the Board’s order
could not be set aside by the court unless the making of the order
constituted an abuse of discretion by the Board, in view of all the facts.
He pointed out that the Act is one sided, that it is intended to prevent
unfair labor practices by employers which affect commerce, but the Board
is without power to punish the unlawful conduct of employees occurring
in connection with a labor dispute; that one who is an employes at the
inception of a labor dispute or unfair labor practice and ceases work
because of either, remains an employee as long as the labor dispute is
"current. " He said the main issue is this. The Board in determining
the scope of its reinstatement order must take into consideration the
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unlawful conduct of the striking employees. When such conduct will
prevent the effectuation of the policies of the Act, it is not within
the lawful authority of the Board to order reinstatement or to refuse
to order it as a punitive measure either against the employees for
unlawful acts or against the employers for engaging in unfair labor
practices.
In other words, the dissenting judge asks the question of
whether or not the policies of the Act will be effectuated in the
reinstatement of the striking employees. He points out that the main
reason for the N. L. R. A. is to prevent the obstruction of the free flow
of commerce, and that the Board's main consideration should be to
determine whether or not this policy can be effected. held that the
events disclosed that the reinstatement of the striking employees would
not hinder or obstruct the policy of the Act because there would be
no disruption of the operation of the Corporation's activities. He
bases his conclusion that there will be no disruption of the Corporation^
operations on the following evidence:
1. That after the eviction of the striking employees from the
plant building, there were no further unlawful acts committed by the
employees.
2. That all the sit-down employees oould have returned to their
jobs if they were willing to return without Union recognition, that the
company was ready to forgive them.
He concludes that in view of these facts, it was reasonable for
the Board to assume that a general reinstatement would not result in friction
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between the employer and the employee, which would obstruct commerce
and thus fail to effectuate the policies of the Act. He does not
approve the acts of the sit-down strikers any more than he approves the
unfair labor practices of the Corporation.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed with modifica-
tion the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court and Mr. Justice Reed dissented
in part.
The Chief Justice centered his main contention around the
fact that the Board misconstrued the National Labor Relations Act. He
said that the Court was unable to conclude that Congress intended to
oompel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their
unlawful conduct; that such legislative intention should be found in
definite and unmistakable terms, if that were the case; that the
recognition in the Act of the "right to strike" plainly contemplates a
lawful strike which amounts to the exercise of the unquestioned right
to quit work; that this case does not represent the exercise of a right
to strike by the use of force to compel the anployer to submit to the
demands of the Union; and that, therefore, the striking employees took
themselves outside the protection of the National Labor Relations Act
and accepted the risk of the termination of their employment. And,
finally, the Board's authority to "effectuate the policies of the Act" is
broad, but not unlimited; remedial, not punitive; to assure the employees
the right of self-organization and freedom of representation, not to
license them to commit tortious acts or to protect them for the
consequences of unlawful conduct.

45.
Mr. Justice Reed dissented in part on the grounds that it was
not unreasonable for the Board to order a restoration of both the
disputants to their original status. He disagreed with the majority
opinion primarily as to the construction of the Act by the majority
opinion. He held that the Act as now construed by the Court enabled
the employer to discharge any striker with or without cause so long as
the discharge is not used to interfere with the self-organization or
collective bargaining of the employees; that the Labor Act was enacted
to protect interstate commerce from the interruption of labor disputes,
and that the interference with the normal exercise of the right to
discharge extends only to the necessity of protecting the relationship
of the parties in an industrial conflict; that the disapproval of a
sit-down strike does not logically compel the acceptance of the theory
that an employer has the power to bar his striking employees from the
protection of the Labor Aot» that it is for this reason that Section 2(3)
was so defined in the Act*
From the points of view expressed by the majority opinion, and
the dissenting Justice we note that the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of whether or not striking employees on a sit-down strike are
entitled to the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. The
majority opinion concluded that they took themselves outside the protection
of the Act and thus accepted the risk of losing their jobs on the theory
that Congress did not intend that they should receive the protection of
the Act where their conduct was unlawful. However, the dissenting
Justice took the opposite view and held that even though the striking
employees were guilty of unlawful conduct, they nevertheless had the
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protection of the Act. based his conclusion on the general intent
of the Act and his construction of it. Therefore, according to him the
Board did possess the authority to reinstate them and that where the
authority of the Board was not unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised,
the Court should not overturn the Board's decision. In other words,
the issue boils down to whether or not Congress had delegated the
authority to the Board to reinstate striking employees whose conduct was
unlawful and who had been discharged by the employer.
It is ray opinion that the Chief Justice rendered the best
possible decision in this case. The Act was designed to help employees
exercise their right to self-organization without interference or
domination by the employer. It was not designed to permit the use ol
force and unlawful conduct by the employees in the exercise of said
rights. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to go so
far as to permit force and unlawful conduct in the exercise of the
rights granted by Congress to employees. And even if Congress were to
explicitly stipulate that striking employees should be reinstated despite
the fact that they used force to compel the employer to accede to theii.
demands, it is highly questionable whether or not this would be constitu-
tional because in effect Congress would be permitting one group to
dispossess another group of its property by means of force and without
due process of law.
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D. Unlawful Conduct of Strikers
2. Serious Strike Violence
Republic Steel Corporation is a case that came up through the
National Labor Relations Board (in the matter of Republic Steel
Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 1938)
to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (107 Federal 2nd 472, 1939).
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (390 U.S. 684).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The union tried to organize the employees and the corporation
began a campaign to crush the union. The union was denounced and vilified.
Employees were threatened with discharge if they joined the "outside”
union. Union organizers were attacked and brutally beaten. At least
18 employees were discharged because of their activity in behalf of the
union.
The corporation refused to sign a centra ct with the union and
about the same time shut down one of its plants, which was a stronghold
of the union, whereupon the union went on strike at the other plants of
the corporation. The strike only lasted a month. Upon the reopening
of the plant, a great many of the corporation’s employees were refused
reinstatement because of their union membership.
From the time the strike began the corporation secured the aid
of Iocs 1 police officials to break picket lines and in many other ways
endeavored to defeat the strike. It incited deliberately violence and
hysteria, in order to terrorize union members.
The striking employees also wrere guilty of violence. However,
the National Labor Relations Board took judicial notice only of the
convictions and pleas of guilty of acts of violence committed by the
individual strikers on the grounds that only such evidence is relevant
as to the issue of whether or not it would effectuate the policies of the
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Act to order reinstatement; and on the grounds that the Board was not
prepared to go into all collateral issues. The strikers were guilty of
such serious violence and crimes as the possession and use of explosives,
malicious destruction of property, possession of a bomb, unlawful
obstruction and retarding the passage of United States mail, discharging
fire arms, carrying concealed weapons, and assault and battery. Moreover,
the strikers were guilty of minor acts of violence.
The National Labor Relations Board's position was that it should
effectuate the policies of the Act, and to do so it felt that it had to
restore as nearly as possible the situation that existed prior to the
commission of the unfair labor practices by the corporation. The
Board did not have the benefit of the Fansteel decision at this time, as
the Fansteel case had not come down from the Supreme Court when the Board
was confronted with this case. Consequently, the Board'3 reasoning was
similar to the reasoning it employed in the Fansteel case. It said in
this case,
"We have found that the strike at the
respondent's plants was caused fundamentally by the
respondent's unfair labor practices. In previous
cases of this character we have required the
employer to reinstate the striking employees, upon
application to their former or substantially
equivalent position. We find this requirement
appropriate and necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the Act in this case."
We note that the Board considers the strike to be caused
"fundamentally" by the corporation's unfair labor practices.
The corporation's contention before the Board was that the
violence of the individual strikers renders the reinstatement of said
strikers inequitable in this case and would defeat rather than effeotuate
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the purposes of the Act. The Board considered this contention of the
corporation and handled it in this fashion. First, it said that it -would
consider only evidence of convictions and pleas of guilty of acts
committed by individual strikers on the grounds that only such evidence
represents direct and not collateral issues -which it should consider,
because the Act is designed to protect employees from unfair labor practices
and not to perform the duties of the local enforcement agencies. The
Board decided that -with the exception of the six strikers who pleaded
guilty to the possession and use of explosives, and the one man who
pleaded guilty to the malicious destruction of property over $300., and
the four men who were found guilty of possession of a bomb, all other
striking employees should be reinstated. The Board reasoned as follows:
That the acts of the strikers were committed in the heat of
turmoil and bitter industrial strife, in which the threat of violence
on the part of the corporation against the strikers was ever present and
frequently carried out; that the strike was brought about "fundamentally"
by the corporation’s own unlawful acts; that the corporation had itself
been guilty of brutal acts of violence far more serious than those
attributed to the strikers in question; that the Board’s power of reinstate-
ment is of discretionary nature and to be exercised in the light of all
the cir cumstances of the case in the manner best calculated to effectuate
the purposes of the Act; and that under these circumstances in the case
of all but the eleven striking employees, the Board found no warrant in
the gravity of the crimes or in the severity of their sentences for
believing that they would not be as fit to work for the corporation then
as they were before the strike; and finally that the reinstatement of all
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the strikers except the aforesaid eleven will not provide any incentive
to violence in future industrial conflicts.
The case then went before the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1939 and Judge Maris wrote the opinion of the court. There was no
dissent. The court upheld the Board’s order that the corporation cease
and desist from interfering with or dominating the employees’ right to
self-organization and to withdraw recognition from and disestablish the
corporation's dominating union. The court was confronted with the issue
of the reinstatement of the striking employees. By the time this case
appeared before the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals the Fansteel
case 1/ had been handed down by the Supreme Court, and the Circuit Court
was bound by that decision. The Circuit Court pointed out that a strike
is a battle with economic weapons, but since human beings were engaged
in this battle, rising passions lead to violence; that violence of this
nature, even though to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation
of Congress when it provided in Section 13 of the Act that nothing therein
should be construed as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike; that therefore minor disorders should not deprive
striking employees of the possibility of reinstatement, z/ However,
the court went on to say that in the present case there was evidence of serious
violence and disorder on the part of many strikers and that the Board
undertook to determine which of these were sufficiently serious to bar
reinstatement. The court decided that in view of the Fansteel case it
could not agree with the Board in arriving at the conclusion that only
l/ Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 360 U. S. 240.
2/ N.L.R.B. vs Stackpole Carbon Co., 6 F.L.R.B. 171, 1938, 105 Federal 2nd
167,
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eleven of the striking employees were guilty of violent and serious
misoonduotj that in addition to the eleven striking employees the Board
had refused reinstatement, the court enumerated the following who should
also be barred from reinstatement because of the serious offenses committed
by them. They included nine convicted of unlawfully obstructing and
retarding the passage of the U. S. mail, three of discharging fire arms,
seven of malicious destruction of property to the value of less than
&300., one of unlawfully interfering with telegraph and telephone messages,
one of transporting explosives, five of interfering with and obstructing
rail tracks, thirteen of carrying concealed weapons and one of assault
and battery; and that all other minor offenses came under the "Staclcpole
rule" and were not a basis to bar reinstatement.
We note in this case that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
was bound by the Fansteel rule but that it also recognized that minor
offenses committed in the heat of industrial strife should not preclude
the Board from reinstating the striking employees, where the Board was of
the opinion that in so doing it would effectuate the purposes of -the Act.
In other words, the rule concerning strikers who employed violence can
be broken down into two parts. First, striking employees whose violence
is of a serious nature (felonies and the like), the Board is without
power to order their reinstatement. The Fansteel case and this case
decided this rule. Second, where the offenses of the striking employees
are not of a serious nature (such as minor strike disorders at the picket
lines and the like), the Board has the power to order the reinstatement of
said employees, where, in its opinion, it will thereby effectuate the
purposes of the Act.

E. Unlawful Strike
Southern Steamship Company is the case that came up through the
National Labor Relations Board (in the matter of Southern Steamship Company
and National Maritime Union of -America, affiliated with the C.I.O. 23
N.L.R.B. 26, 1940) to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (120 Federal
2nd 505, 1941) to the United States Supreme Court (316 U.S. 31).
The facts of the case are as follows*
The Board certified the union. Officers of the union sought to
arrange collective bargaining conferences with the company. The
company refused. Because the company refused the union members of the
company’s vessel "City of Fort Worth" went on strike when the vessel
docked in Houston, Texas, having made a trip from Philadelphia to Houston.
The striking employees remained seated on the poop deck of
the ship in an orderly manner. At no time were they ordered to leave
the vessel. They did not interfere with the operations of the vessel*
They were even served their mid-day meal.
The company agreed to recognize the union, so the strike was
called off. Then the company discharged five members of the crew.
Whereupon, the other union members left the ship in protest.
The Board found that the five seamen were discharged because
of their active participation in the strike, that their discharge
constituted an active violation of the Act, and -that it was because of
this unlawful discharge that the other seamen left the ship in protest.
Thereupon, the Board ordered the company to offer reinstatement with
back pay to all the strikers. The principal contention of the company
is that it had the right to discharge the striking seamen because they
went on a "sit-down" strike, and the discharge of the said strikers was
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therefore justified under the rule laid down in the Fansteel case. 2/
The Board found and concluded as follows*
"...The strikers neither unlawfully seized
any portion of the ship nor despoiled any of the
respondent's property thereon. The striking
employees merely sat on the poop deck, the usual
place of meeting and recreation for members of the
crew when off duty; the ship remained fully in the
possession of the respondent and its authorized
officers, and the work of loading the ship proceeded
without delay. No attempt was made by the strikers
to interfere with the normal operations on shipboard;
and as we have noted, the vessel sailed on schedule
at the conclusion of the strike on the same day...
Unlike an industrial plant, a ship is not only the
place of employment but also the living quarters
of the crew... At no time were strikers ordered to
leave the ship."
In view of its findings of fact the Board ordered that the
striking employees be reinstated with back pay. The board did not give
any reasons for deciding that this case is not similar to the Fansteel
case. It merely ordered reinstatement based on its findings of fact, thus
indicating that the facts do not warrant the conclusion that the Fansteel
rule applied.
The case then went to the Federal Circuit Court and Circuit
Judge Maris wrote the mejority opinion with Circuit Judge Clark dissenting.
The majority opinion held that this case did not come under the
Fansteel rule. The court said,
"With this contention we cannot agree. The
strikers were guilty of no violence or other unlawful
conduct. They did not take or hold possession of the
ship... They merely withheld their services during the
time of the strike, without interfering in any way
with the work of the officers and nonstriking members
of the crew...We think that there is no sound basis
for depriving seamen of the right to strike when.
1/ N.L.R. B. vs Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240.
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as here, the vessel is moored to the dock in a safe,
domestic port. Whether or net the right exists in a
foreign port, we need not decide. 1
’
Then the majority opinion went on to say that this case is to
be distinguished from the case where a vessel is at sea or is net safely
moored to dock, on the theory that the absolute power conferred upon the
master of a ship at sea is for the protection of the lives and property
entrusted to his care, but when his vessel is safely in port, the
necessity for such absolute power is gone.
Circuit Judge Clark dissented on an entirely different basis
from the main position of the majority opinion. The majority opinion
is based on the theory that the vessel was safely in port and, therefore,
the law of the sea, giving the master of the vessel absolute powers
need not be invoked; and since no violence was employed by the striking
employees, the Fansteel doctrine need not also be invoked. The dissenting
Justice does not approach the problem from the sit-down angle. His
approach, in his opinion, is more fundamental than this. He maintains,
in essence, that in the case of vessels they differed so much from the
ordinary industrial dispute where factory employees are involved, the
rights granted industrial employees who go on strike should not be
granted to seamen. And the fact that the vessel is safe in port does
not change his main thesis. He argues that while the vessel is in port,
the immediate security of all concerned is not greatly jeopardized by the
crew's refusal to do its duty; but it isn’t the immediate safety that
must be considered. It is a question of ultimate safety. Discipline
is necessary at all times. A master who cannot control his crew in
port is not likely to be able to control it at sea.
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He further points out that the Fansteel case declared a limita-
tion on the National Labor Relations Act. The right to strike is not
absolute according to him, and the case in point is one where a special
environment is involved. It is the sea. And because of this special
environment, the National Labor Relations Act does not cover this partic-
ular case.
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
as to the issue regarding the reinstatement of the strikers.
Mr. Justice Burns delivered the opinion of the majority opinion.
He said that if this were a case where an employer indulged in an unfair
labor practice and a strike resulted and several men were discharged
for participating in the strike, and the Board ordered that the strikers
be reinstated in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, the case
would be simple enough and the court would uphold the Board's decision. 1
/
But this case is different from a simple case, as the one described. It
is the case where the strike was conducted by seamen on board a vessel
and away from home port, and the issue is whether or not this circumstance
renders an abuse of discretion for the Board to order reinstatement of
the strikers. The majority opinion held that it was an abuse of discretion.
It said.
"Ever since men have gone to sea, the
relationship of master and seaman has been entirely
different from that of employer and employee on
land. The lives of passengers and crew, as well as
the safety of the ship and cargo, are entrusted to
the master’s care. . .Authority cannot be divided.
These are actualities which the law has always
recognized.
"
N.L. R. E. vs Stackpole Carbon Company, 105 Federal 2nd 167

The court went on to say that the strike aboard the vessel
was in violation of Section 292 (inciting revolt or mutiny on shipboard)
and Section 293 (revolt or mutiny on shipboard), \J because each of
the strikers resisted the captain and other officers in the lav/ful
exercise of their authority and command within the meaning of Sections
292 and 29 3. Strikers deliberately and persistently denied direct
commands to perform their duties in making ready for the departure from
port. And even though they did not engage in violence or prevent the
other men and officers from proceeding with the preparations for the
voyage, they did what they could to prevent "the ship from sailing and
they undertook to impose their will upon the captain and officers.
Moreover, the majority opinion refused the distinction that
the Circuit Court of Appeals drew, namely, that a distinction lies
between a strike at sea and a strike at dock when a vessel is safely
moored. The majority opinion relied upon the words of the criminal
statute and held that the words therein are plain enough and shew that
it has long been settled the t the Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction
of the United States includes all navigable waters within the country,
and that the water in the harbor of Houston is certainly navigable.
The majority opinion denied the assumption of the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals that the necessity for absolute authority in
the master of a ship is considerably diminished when the ship is moored
in a ’’safe 1’ port; that a strike in such circumstances should not be
held to violate the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court
points out that this assumption ignores the plain Congressional mandate
that a rebellion by seamen against their officers on board a vessel
y U. S. Criminal Code
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anywhere within the Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the United
States is to be punished as mutiny; and that this mandate is to be
changed by Congress and not by the courts.
The majority opinion said that the Board’s authority under
Section IOC (effectuate the policies of the Act) has its limitations
as shown by the Fansteel case and the Republic Steel Corporation case;
and that therefore the Board cannot ignore other and equally important
Congressional objectives such as the Admiralty and Maritime statutes
enacted by Congress.
The dissenting opinion was voiced by Justice Reed with three
other justices concurring in this dissent. The dissenting opinion has
as its main thesis the fact that this case fell outside the Fansteel
decision, so the Circuit Court of Appeals was justified in upholding
the Board’s decision. It pointed out that in the Fansteel case the
sit-down strikers held the corporation’s buildings from February 17th
until February 26th, and they disobeyed a court injunction, and that
it took the sheriff and his forces two attempts to get them out.
"Whereas, in this case no such disorder took place. The seaman’s conduct
did not affect the safety of the vessel. The Company was the "primary”
cause for the strike. Consequently, since this case fell out of the
Fansteel doctrine and since the Board exercised its discretion to reinstate
these men, the Board’s order should be upheld. That the majority opinion's
decision unduly expands judicial review of the Board's discretionary
power of reinstatement under Section IOC.
It is my opinion that the main issue in this case is whether
or not to permit seamen who man the vessels that travel on the seas of
',
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the world to come under the National Labor illations Act. The majority
opinion of the Supreme Court held that the seamen represented a special
class of people and that they were not similar to employees of a factory
and, therefore, should not come under the Act. The Supreme Court’s
position appears to be rather valid. It is my opinion that both the
Board and the majority opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals overlooked
this special feature regarding seamen and the special problems their
kind of work represent. A law like the National Labor halations Act
is better able to cope with an employer- employee situation where an
industrial set-up is involved. I do not think that such an Act can
adequately cover the ramifications and the special problems which the
master-seaman relationship entails. It is for this reason I believe a
separate law enacted by Congress should govern this special situation,
and the fact that the striking seamen acted in a peaceful manner does
not change the principle at all.
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F. Violation of No Strike Agreement
National Labor Relations Board vs Sands Manufacturing Company
oase came up through the National Labor Relations ^oard (l N.L. R.B. 456,
1936) to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (96 Federal 2nd 721) to th
United States Supreme Court (306 U.S. 332).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The union, known as M. E. S. A., entered into a contre ct with
the Company which provided for an increase in wages, for the discharge
of certain employees objected to by the union’s shop committee and
othervrise regulated the conditions of employment. Subsequently, the
company, having filled its orders, cut down the operation of its plant
to three days a week. The company wished to increase the force in the
machine shop in order to prepare stock and, therefore, wanted to employ
for that purpose new men experienced in machine shop work, instead of
transferring men from other departments. It claimed that the contract
entitled it to employ this method. The union contended that under the
contract no new men could be hired for the machine shop so long as
other men in other departments of the planbwere not employed.
The pertinent articles of the agreement are
”5. That when employees are laid off, seniority
rights shall rule (and by departments).
"6. That when one department is shut down,
men from this department shall not be transferred
or work in other departments until all old men (only)
within that department, who were laid off, have been
called baok.
”7. That all new employees be laid off
before any old employees, in order to guarantee, if
possible, at least one week's full time, before the
working week is reduced to three days.”

6Q
For many years it had been the practice at the plant to
transfer men from one department to another. The facts disclosed that
when this contract was negotiated, the company insisted that because
the practice of transferring men from one department to another
resulted in inefficiency, certain paragraphs be altered. The alterations
made are in parentheses in the articles of the agreement shown above.
Because of this disagreement, the company closed the plant down.
Later it opened up again and invited a number of its machine shop
employees, all members of the International Association of Machinists,
to return to workj but filled other places in the machine shop with new
men, instead of calling old me from other departments of the plant. Only
four men of the M. E. S. A. union were called back to work for the
company on the condition that they join the International Association
of Machinists. The company refused to negotiate with M. E. S. A.
union on the grounds it had broken its agreement. Thereupon, the M. E. S. A.
union picketed the company’s plant.
The National Labor Relations Board was confronted with the
interpretation of Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the contract. It concluded
that the M. E. S. A. union was not unreasonable in contending that
the preference to old men over new men applied to the whole plant and
not only to departments. It found the following facts:
1. That it was easy to transfer men from one department to
another as the work had been simplified.
2. Employees had been transferred from one department to
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another during the past year,
3, Most of the men had worked in a machine shop at one time
or another,
4, The company was able to break in new men for a government
order without apparent difficulty, which demonstrates that the old
employees could have been used without a drop in efficiency.
5, There is no evidence that the old employees were inefficient
when transferred to the machine shop.
In view of these facts, the Board found that the company had
refused to bargain collectively with the representative of its old
employees, That by failing to recall its employees who were members
of the M. E. S. A. and by requiring that certain of them join the
International Association of Machinists as a condition of anployment,
the company discriminated against its employees in regard to tenure of
employment and thereby discouraged membership in the M. E, S. A., and
by these acts the company interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under the Act. That
after the shut down of August 21, 1935 the old M. E. S. A. men continued
to be employees of the company irrespective of the cause of the shut
down and that an employee under Section 2(3) of the Act includes "any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of or in connection
with any current labor dispute or because of an unfair labor practice..."
Judge Allen wrote the opinion for the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court denied the petition of the National I^ibor Relations Board for
enforcement of its order against the company. The court agreed with the
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company's interpretation of the contract and, hence, concluded that the
urn on broke its contract. The court referred to the fact that it had
teen the company’s practice when work was slack to transfer men from
their regular departments to ether departments. That the company
considered this practice inefficient and, therefore, when the contract
was negotiated it insisted that the words " and by departments
1
' at the
end of paragraph 5 be inserted. That the express purpose of the company
for inserting these words was to discontinue the practice of calling old
men back, except to their own departments. That since the union
employees had violated their contract prior to the date when the company
refused to meet with the union’s representatives, the company was not
guilty of an unfair labor practice. That after the contract was
broken by the union employees, the company did not have to live up to
any of th9 terms cf the contract. The court further said that the National
Labor Relations Act does not interfere with the normal right of an
employer to select or discharge his employees, and if employees violate
their contract, they may be discharged for that reason, and the
discharge does not constitute a discrimination in regard to tenure of
employment nor an unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court's opinion was written by Mr. Justice Roberts.
The court said that the company did not interfere vrith the employees*
union, M. E. S. A.; that in fact it entered into an agreement with it.
That the evidence shows that this matter regarding transferring employees from
one department to another was fully discussed before the contract was executed.
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and that the union members understood the company’s position and the
reason for the alterations. That the oompany was at liberty to treat
them as having severed their relation with the company because of their
breach of contract, and to consummate their separation from the company's
employ by hiring others to take their places. That the Act does not
prohibit the discharge of an employee for the breach of his contract any
more than it prohibits a discharge for a tort committed against the
employer.
It is my opinion that this case demonstrates that unless a
statute clearly stipulates to the contrary, the rules of the common
law will be invoked by the courts. In this case, we note that the
union and the company entered into a contract, and because of past
experience the company inserted certain phrases in the contract. The
opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals and that of the Supreme Court was
passed ty usingthe common law approach to the interpretation of a contract.
On the other hand, the Board sought to defend the union's position by
referring to the National Labor Relations Act and by trying to show that
even if the employees broke this contract, they were nevertheless employees
xonder Section 2(3) of the Aot. Of course, the courts would not go along
with this reasoning. Also, we note that the Board emphasized faots that
had no connection with the purpose for the alterations made in the
contract. The courts stuck to the oommon law rules, whereas the Board
felt that the common law rules should not apply very strictly in ihis
case. It is difficult to say whether the Board's approach should be used
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in all cases. It may be that by following the common law in its
strict sense many features of the National Labor Relations Act can be
undermined and even defeated. However, it seems to me in this case that
the courts rendered the best decision. The facts show that the contract
between the company and the union was negotiated in good faith and
these alterations were not made for the purpose to permit the employees
to renege on their part of the contract. There is nothing in the Act
that makes it an unfair labor practice to discharge employees who
break their contract.
-.
«
G. "Wildcat Strike
National Labor Relations Board vs Draper Corporation case
came up through the National Labor Relations Board (52 H.L.R.B. 1477,
1943) to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (145 Federal 2nd 199, 1944).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The union had a contract with the corporation for one year. At
the end of the year a conference was held to negotiate a new contract,
and after some difficulties the corporation agreed that a conference be
held with the representatives of the union on October 15th. On October
14th the union representative was ready for the conference but was
advised that the secretary of the corporation and its bargaining
representative was ill in Massachusetts, and for that reason could not
attend the conference. The Board found as a fact that the said secretary
was ill.
The following day 41 of the employees, under the leadership of
an officer of the union, went on a "wildcat" strike because they were of
the opinion the corporation was stalling. The corporation discharged the
striking employees for engaging in a sit-down strike and ordered them to
leave the plant. The strikers departed peacefully. There was no violence
at any time and no seizure of the corporation’s property. The union did
not call or authorize a strike or sanction it in any way. The corporation
refused to reinstate the discharged employees. The issue in this case is
whether or not the discharge of the 41 striking employees and the subse-
quent refusal to re-employ them were unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act
.
•.
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The Board held that even though the strike was unauthorized
by the union, was unprevoked by unfair labor practices, and was ill-
advised, it was nevertheless a labor dispute, and for that reason the
individuals who participated in it retained their status as employees
within the meaning of the Actj that the corporation therefore was not
privileged to discharge the employees and that the said employees are
entitled to back pay from the date of the corporations refusal to reinstate
them.
Mr. Reilly dissented in part by holding that back pay should
not have been allowed by the Board because the striking employees failed
to resort to the administrative process of the Board, and that it is a
well-established doctrine that the policies of the Act are most
appropriately effectuated by encouraging employees to resort to
administrative process rather than to activities interrupting commerce.
He held in effect that employees who do not go through the administrative
process of the Board by instead go on a strike, and thus interrupt commerce,
should be denied back pay.
Decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was written
by Judge Parker. The petition by the National Labor Relations Board for
enforcement of its order was denied. The court said that the issue is
whether or not the "wildcat” strike, in which the discharged employees were
engaged, falls within the protection of Section 7 of the Act. The court
held that there can be no effective bargaining if small groups of employees
''’•! i
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are at liberty to ignore the bargaining agency the majority of employees
have set up; that the whole proposition of the Act is to give to the
employees as a whole, through action of a majority, the right to bargain
with the employer with respects to such matters as wages, hours, and
conditions of work. That the employees must act through, the voice of
the majority; that minority groups must acquiesce in the action of the
majority and that just as the minority has no right to engage in separate
bargaining arrangements with the employer, so it has no right to take
independent action to interfere with the course of bargaining which is
being carried out by the duly authorized bargaining agent chosen by the
majority. That there is nothing in the statute, properly construed,
which protects from discharge those who strike in defiance of its provi«
sions, and that finally since those engaged in the "wildcat" strike were
not protected from discharge and their reinstatement was not required,
there was no basis for finding an unfair labor practice on the employer’s
part, and that this is true, not only as to the men who were discharged,
but also as to those who joined their strike and made common cause with
them.
It is my opinion that the Circuit Court analyzed the problem
properly. The Act is designed to encourage collective bargaining by
the majority of an appropriate unit and that any interference with this
right is considered an unfair labor practice. The Act does not provide
that a minority of an appropriate bargaining unit can go on a "wildcat"
strike and still retain the benefits of the Act. Therefore, since "wildcat"
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striking employees are not covered by the Act, they run the risk of being
discharged without having any recourse to the Act . This conclusion is
reasonable, not only from the standpoint of the manner in which the Act
is construed, but also from a practical standpoint. Employees who join
a union must accede to the wishes of the majority. Any other rule would
create chaos and put the majority in a position where it could not
effectively bargain with the employer.
..
H. Strike To Coerce Illegal Act
American News Company, Inc. case came up before the National
Labor Relations Board (55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1944)
.
The facts of this case are as follows.
On or about October 15, 1942, as a result of collective
bargaining, the corporation and the union reached an agreement providing
for an increase in wages. Shortly after this, Congress amended the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 by the passage of a bill intended
to limit and control wage increases. The President issued an executive
order prohibiting any wage increase until it had been approved by the
National War Labor Board. Both the corporation and the union tried to
procure approval of the proposed wage increase from the National War
Labor Board.
The union threatened to strike unless it received the proposed
increase. The corporation refused on the grounds that it could not
lawfully grant the increase without prior approval of the National War
Labor Board#
Thereupon, the union members went on strike. The corporation
regarded the action of the union members in resorting to a strike as a
termination of their employment. Subsequently, the union members
decided to return to work but the corporation did not offer them
reinstatement. The corporation's failure to reinstate the striking
employees was not based upon the claim that their positions had been
permanently filled. Other than the corporation’s treatment of the strike
as terminating the employment of the union members, the record is barren
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of any evidence of unfair labor practices by the corporation.
The case went before the Board, and the majority opinion of
the Board was confronted with the issue whether or not the strike,
standing by itself in that it was neither provoked nor preceded by an
unfair labor practice, was the kind of collective activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act, so as to make the corporation’s action in treating
the employment terminated and in refusing reinstatement a violation of
Section 8. The Board held that since the preamble of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 expressly enjoins the Board, among other
agencies, to work toward a stabilization of prices, fair and equitable
wages, and cost of production, the conclusion that cannot be escaped is
that the wage stabilization statute is the kind of enactment to which
the National Labor Relations Act should be accommodated, if this can
reasonably be done . The Board went on to point out that this case does
not involve the question of restricing the right to strike. The sole
question is whether or not the corporation’s treatment of the strikers
under the circumstances in this case was an unfair labor practice. The
Board concluded that a strike such as this, prosecuted in order to compel
an employer to violate the National lar Labor Act, is not within the concerted
activities protection of Section 7. The Board quoted the Fansteel case,
the Sands case, and the Southern Steamship case, to show that strikers were
not given the protection of the Act where their conduct was unlawful.
Chairman Millis dissented with the majority opinion. He held
.,
.
: v
•
,
.
71
that Section 7 of the Act, which gives the employees the right to engage
in concerted activities for collective bargaining purposes, was not
intended by Congress to be vitiated on the grounds that such concerted
activity is not consonant with another Federal statute. That because
of the attendant circumstances and because of the nature of the strike,
he would only deny the men back pay but he would order reinstatement.
It is my opinion that the majority opinion rendered a
sensible decision by requiring the employees to go through the National
War Labor Board for an increase in wages before they could go on
strike during the emergency period of the second World War and did not
thereby deprive the said employees from the right to strike. It merely
delayed the exercise of that right, and in view of the emergency that
existed, such a delay was not unreasonable. When the employees saw fit
to disregard the National War Labor Act, they left themselves open
to be discharged by the employer. Any other kind of decision, especially
the one recommended by Chairman Millis, would enable striking employees
to flaunt the law of the country without due regard for the very existence
of that country.

IV. Industrial Disputes
A. General Statement
In the first three chapters we covered some of the aspects of
strike law as it developed under the National Labor Relations Aot,
taking into consideration some of the background of strike case law and
strike legislation. We directed our attention to the effects, rather
than the causes, of industrial disputes. We saw how the National
Labor Relations Board ana the courts handled a strike case under the Act.
We considered the background of the right to strike. We did not stop
to consider any of the causes for the strikes that occurred. It goes
without saying that to treat the effects and to neglect the causes of
a problem is to do the job in half measures. The causes are equally
as important, if not more important, as are the effects.
A strike is but the overt manifestation, the eruption of an
industrial dispute. Before the strike ensues many factors are at play
which constitute the cause for the strike. What are these factors?
Herein we shall consider some of the causes. Having determined some
of the causes of industrial disputes, we shall briefly consider some
of the other aspects of the problem, such as collective bargaining,
public policy and organized labor as a political and economic power.
Thus we shall have considered a few of the factors that go into making
up the problem of strikes in our interdependent economy. It is the
purpose of this approach to give the reader a perspective from which he
will view the many ramifications of the problem, to enable him to
appreciate the real nature of the problem better.
Merely to say that strikes (or the threat of a strike) were
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and are necessary if labor is to assert its rights in an oversimplifi-
cation of the problems involved*
What are the basic problems confronting the employer and his
employees in their relationship to each other? Is it wages, hours and
working conditions only? Or, are there other factors we should consider.
Whether or not a worker feels he is economically secure, is this of any
oonsequence?
Why is cooperation between the employer and the employees so
difficult to achieve? Why must labor go through a costly strike, both
to the employer and to lsbor itself, to achieve its demands? It has
been put this way:
"Why? Why at the present juncture of
labor relations, with the wide acceptance of
joint dealings, does the administrator -- of
union as well as of industry — who is anxious
to promote cooperation find himself compelled to
deal so predominantly with conflict?. * Whatever
reservations or antagonisms remain in the ranks of
management, the spokesmen for industry continue
generally to affirm their conviction that the
unions are here to stay and their desire to make
collective bargaining work. Labor leaders,
certainly, hold to their always fundamental
belief in free collective bargaining as the sound
and enduring instrument of dealings between
management and men.
"
Such are the questions one can pose to this problem that is
plaguing our economy, and threatening our way of life.
The perspective from which a problem is considered is of
major importance. If it is biased or colored one way or another, then
obviously not much headway can be made in arriving at the proper solution.
1/ Labor Relations and Human Relations by Benjamin M. Selekman, 1947,
Pages 3 and 4.
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B. Industrial Unrest
After the Second World War, though we possessed the potential
capacity to produce the goods we and the rest of the world needed, we
found our economic strength dissipated in frustrating conflicts between
capital and labor. We should not be so shortsighted as to blame
organized labor for all our post-war troubles. The public became
indignant at organized labor during this period because the actions of
labor were overt and dramatic. However, the abuses of labor, and there
were some, were no greater in effect than those of the other participants
in our national economy.
Unions today have great strategic strength in basic industries,
such as coal, oil, steel, transportation, power, etc. Labor leaders
must realize they have a public trust; and to abuse it will bring upon
them the wrath of public opinion. Our economy is so interdependent that
a strike in a basic industry results in a creeping paralysis of our
whole economy.
"Certainly today, when unions have won
wide acceptance, the drive for economic gain
must be harnessed to considerations of productivity
and costs. Group solidarity must be integrated with
wider communal loyalties. In our interdependent
economy, unions must accept responsibility for
general welfare, not only for special group
welfare, The uses of hostility must be far dif-
ferent in unions that have attained an effective
place in industry from what they are in
organizations still struggling for recognition....
The labor leader must recognize that peaceful
advance has now become his major mode of
progress — and that he must harness the motives
of conflict to attain full effectiveness in the
new course. This is a crucial change, indeed, and
far easier to prescribe than to accomplish." 1/
1{ Labor Relations and Human Relations by Benjamin M. Selekman, 1947,
Pages 179 and 180.
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Management, on the other hand, should not provoke labor in
order to force public opinion against labor. No sensible employer can
feel that labor unionism will be crushed. On the employer's shoulders
rests a grave responsibility to get along with labor. The employer can
do much to prevent labor disturbances. He should try to get to the
root of the problem before it is too late.
"Industrial unrest manifests itself in
a more or less continuing state of uncertainty,
uneasiness, and aimless activity arising out of
unaccounted for fears or unsatisfied longings.
Vague rumors and restrained emotional excitement
often accompany early stages of so-called
•inarticulate' social or industrial unrest....
TShen the unrest becomes sufficiently organized
that it takes form for the expression of open
protests and petitioning for requested change,
it is out in the open and has become articulate.
There is little difficulty in recognizing unrest when
it reaches this stage. Its outward manifestations
are the parade, strike, boycott, etc....If
inarticulate unrest can be minimized and the
individuals and group find satisfaction in their
work situation, the more vocal and aotive stages
will seldom arise." l/
Management must recognize the problems of industrial unrest
and act before the inarticulate unrest becomes articulate. That is,
management must devise techniques that are adequate to cope with
industrial unrest before it becomes active.
Employers should not consider labor problems as merely
economic. Man does not live by bread alone.
"Industry is a social as well as an
economic phenomenon. An industrial concern is
not only an organization for the promotion of
economic purposes; it is also a human organization
l/ Personnel Management, Principles, Practices, and Point of View by
Scott, Clothier, Mathewson, and Spriegel, 1941, Pages 483 and 484
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in which the hopes and aspirations of individuals
are trying to find expression. ... Scientifi
c
controls have been introduced to further the
economic purposes of a concern and of the
individuals within it. .. .Nothing comparable to
this advance has gone in the personal relations
between employer and employee." 1/
An efficient supervisor may not be an effective labor relations
man. There are some highly intelligent and logical men, who, within
their areas of specialty are extremely efficient, but who are weak in
the art of human relations.
Management should try to understand the character of labor
unions so that it can better appreciate the problems involved.
"The tenacious reliance of unions upon
the ultimate test of strength — that is, the
strike — inheres in their instrinsic character
as protest institutions. Labor leaders dwell
proudly on the record of progressive improvement
in workers' conditions achieved through ceaseless
employee pressure. .. .Because the advance has
always been a battle also, the union, even after
recognition, continues to be a fighting
organization. " 2/
The law, itself, is not enough to settle industrial disputes.
At best, the law can set the bounds and limits. The effective
relationship of institutions does not depend for its day to day
dealings on the law.
What are the pressures? The union leader is pressed by the
demands of the rank and file. And the employer is pressed by the demands
of our economic system, that is, competition, costs, purchasing power, etc.
Each side should try to understand the problems confronting the other.
1/ Management and Morale by F. J. Roethlisberger, 1946, Page 27.
Labor Relations and Human Relations by Benjamin M. Selekman, 1947,
Pages 179 and 180.

In this way industrial harmony has a good chance to succeed. A
modern employer should have a personnel department which thinks in terms
of the individual employee who has many and varied wants. Every attempt
should be made to satisfy these wants whenever possible and feasible.
No modern efficient business organization can hope to maintain harmoniou
labor relations over the long run without an adequate personnel program.
The following requirements are essential:
"It is obvious. . .that the development of
a wholesome personnel situation within a company...
depends upon three separate factors.
”1. The suocess of the higher oommand in
determining labor policies wisely.
"2. The success of the personnel manager in
interpreting these personnel policies
properly, in achieving their proper
execution through line executives....
”3. The success of the line executive
themselves. . . • ’ 1/
C. Collective Bargaining
A phenomenon we should fully appreciate is the present-day
virtually unanimous acceptance by employers, the government and the
public of the principle of collective bargaining. It has been accepted
as a part of the industrial relationship of oapital and labor.
Collective bargaining has received wide acceptance only in
recent years. It is, perhaps, that because it is of recent development
that both the employer and the unions have found it difficult to adjust
l/ Personnel Management by Scott, Clothier, Mathewson and Spriegel,
1941, Page 49.
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themselves to this new method of settling differences. No system of
human endeavor, which has aimed at enabling people to live harmoniously,
has been devised to work with much success at the outset. Human
progress is noted for the trial and error period it must go through
before some measure of perfection can be attained. It will take some
time for both the employers and the unions to adjust themselves to this
new system of settling their differences. One of our main troubles is
that we expeot too much too soon. On the on9 hand we want to give labor
new rights; and on the other, we expect both capital and labor to
adjust themselves to these new rights without any external manifestations.
Every effort should be made to make collective bargaining work.
It represents a truly democratic way of enabling both sides to settle
their differences. Collective bargaining represents a means of
compromise, which has enabled this country to economically progress
without major social upheavals. If collective bargaining breaks down,
it will be very unfortunate, if not disastrous, to our way of life.
Out present-day society is much too much dependent upon our economy to
live, and serious labor disputes can be extremely harmful. The following
excerpt stresses the importance of the problem:
"It is important that collective bargaining
have a good record of settling disputes. The economy
is highly interdependent, and is becoming more so.
As trade unionism spreads and as the area of
bargaining grows, the failure of the two sides to
reach agreements means that the community is cut off
from a large part or all of the output of essential
commodities. Tfflhen the workers and the employers in
an industry ask the community to go without an
important commodity or service, such as coal, steel.
1/ The Challenge of Industrial Relations by Sumner H. Slichter, 1947,
Pages 27 and 28.
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trucking service, elevator service, steamship
service or railroad service, in order that the
union and the employers may test which is
willing to stand the longer shutdown, they are
asking an extraordinary favor of the public....
Both unions and employers. .. should exercise great
ingenuity and determination to make collective
bargaining produce settlements. If it produces
strikes or lockouts, the community is bound to
take away the extraordinary privilege now given
trade unions and employers in bargaining over
the price of labor and to replace collective
bargaining with a different process.” l/
The employer class now accepts the idea that unions are here
to stay, and that the best way to avoid industrial conflict is to
discover ways and means to make collective bargaining work. This is,
indeed a great stride in the progress of industrial peace.
”Time and again during the tumultuous
years after November 1918, strike sectors and
other scenes of industrial conflict were
transformed into veritable battlefronts on which
men were killed, property destroyed, and sporadic
fighting, in the words of responsible historians
rapidly matured into ’civil war.’ To say merely
that after V-J Day we have not encountered
anything like such violence or no quarter conflict
fails to portray at all adequately the quality of
the change. For the first time in industrial
history, a wave of major strikes passed over the
country without a single attempt by management to
crush the unions involved. If law — and labor
shortages — deterred efforts to import or use
strike-breakers, there were also few attempts to
force entry through picket lines. Instead,
employers actually provided shelters against the
wintry cold for pickets and sent them warm
refreshments.” 2/
Collective bargaining is a tremendous advartage to the
employees. It enables them to represent their demands as a unit, and
The Challenge of Industrial Relations by Sumner H. Slichter, 1947,
Pages 124, 125, and 126.
2^ Labor Relations and Human Relations by Benjamin M. Selekman, 1947,
Page 193.
.....
... .
an tse »d:t
.
.
:
,
,
.
i
• 1 '
J
,
t
'
•
.
by so doing bring to bear the influence of the whole group.
’’There are two elements in collective
bergaining: collective action and representative
negotiation. Collective action or the threat to
use such action is the power by which the workers’
representatives may gain some of their objectives....
The advantages to labor from representative
negotiation or bargaining are fairly obvious.
"Collective labor agreements. Successful
collective bargaining results in a collective
agreement between the workers' combination and the
employer or employees. Unsuccessful bargaining may
mean a strike or simply a continuation of the
Never before have we had collective bargaining on so wide a
scale. Collective bargaining has been quite successful. We don't
hear about the settlements made between capital and labor; but the
record, which follows, is impressive:
stoppages does not reflect, except indirectly, the
degree to which customary practices of collective
bargaining succeed in settling the overwhelming
proportion of labor controversies. Some
perspective on this generally unpublicized pattern
of peaceful negotiations between unions and employers
may be obtained by noting that in 1946 approximately
14.8 million workers were covered by collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by representatives
of some 50,000 to 60,000 local unions with an even
larger number of employers. Although the number
of union agreements in effect is not known, the
Bureau estimates that this total is substantially
in excess of 50,000. Most agreements are revised
or amended annually; some are effective for longer
periods. Many of these, however, contain a
'reopening' clause permitting the renegotiation
of certain provisions (usually those covering
wages) during the life of the agreement. It may,
therefore, be conservatively estimated that 50,000
or more agreements are rewritten in whole, or in
l/ Economics of Labor by Richard A, Lester, 1946, Pages 602, 603, 604.
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part, each year, mostly without a work stoppage
and in some cases even without a serious dispute
requiring the aid of a third party.
"Hecords of federal and State consideration and
mediation agencies show that the number of
disputes settled without recourse to interruptions
of work far outnumber those which result in work
stoppages....” 1/
Collective bargaining has been fostered by public policy as
an instrument of industrial peace. Labor got the right to bargain
collectively with the employers after a long, bitter struggle over the
years. Public policy will not take this right away, but it will require
that it be properly used.
It is strange to note that though people accept the principle
of competition among the business firms, even though many times this
has a detrimental effect on sooiety much greater than a series of
strikes, nevertheless they decry labor for going on strike. A strike
is an economic struggle, only instead of having the participants two
rival companies, here it is the employees as against the employer.
Both kinds of economic conflict are harmful to sooiety. Under our
present system of government, however, we should consider both important
in attaining the goal we all seek; namely, individual freedom under an
economic system that tries to attain the greatest possible production
by permitting the economically strong to survive.
There is also another struggle going on; and that is the
struggle between the public on the one hand and capital and labor on
the other. Where the public interest is affected, a strike is no
l/ United States Lepartraent of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin No. 918, Page 5
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longer a private battle between capital and labor to be resolved by
the stronger of the two. It is a battle that the general public has
a vital interest in. And so it becomes Increasingly important that
collective bargaining be made to work.
Progress towards industrial peace is evolutionary. As we
acquire experience and wisdom in dealing with this problem, we
formulate laws by which we try to give each side a fair opportunity to
protect its rights, but at the same time to respect the rights of the
other.
D. Public Policy Declared
The basis for giving the right to workers to organize into
unions, to bargain collectively with employers and to go on strike when
they do not receive their demands is public policy. A legal right, even
though it upsets traditional and well established rights, is created
when public policy demands it.
”For modern times, the fountain head of
analysis is Mr. Justice Holmes in his paper,
’Privilege, Malice and Intent’ (8 Harvard L. Rev.
1, 1894) and in his opinions in Vegelahn V. Guntner
(167 Mass. 92, 1896) Plant v. Woods (176 Mass. 492,
1900) and Aikens v. Wisconsin (195 U.S. 194, 1904).
"’...prima facie, the intentional
infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action,
which, as a matter of substantive law. . .requires a
justification if the defendant is to escape (Aikens
v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 1904).*
"There are various justifications. . .in
all such cases the ground of decision is policy; and
the advantages to the community, on the one side and
the other, are the only matters really entitled to
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be weighed (8 Harvard L. Rev. 1,9; Collected Legal
papers 1920, 130-31).’" 1/
The expressed public policy of the United States government
since 1932 has been to grant the workers the freedom to organize into
unions and by means of the union to collectively bargain with the
employer.
Public policy, as expressed in the various laws since 1932,
has made explicit the fact that the -workers shall have the freedom
they need to unionize. Let us consider the various laws that
enunciate this policy, which in effect created new rights.
1. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1932, states that public policy
approves the right of workers to bargain collectively "free from the
interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor or their
agents in the designation of such representatives or in self-organi zation
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...."
2. The National Industrial Recovery Act, 1933, Section 7a read
as follows: "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing and shall
be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers or
their agents in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization, or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining...."
3. The National Labor Relations Act, 1935, Section 1 reads
in part as follows: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
\J The Labor Injunction by Frankfurter & Green, Page 24.
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United States to eliminate the oauses of substantial obstruction to
the free flow of commerce. by encouraging. .. collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise of workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terns and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
4. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, though it
has gone further than the National Labor Relations Act in many
substantial ways, nevertheless recognizes the right of employees to
have the freedom to organize into unions and to have equality of
bargaining power with the employer. The Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, Sectionl, in part reads as follows: "Experience has proved that
protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees."
The above quotations from the laws of this country demonstrate
that public policy favoring unions as such is fairly well entrenched
and that it will take a major upheaval to destroy it. It becomes
apparent "that we need intelligent labor leaders just as we need
intelligent business leaders if this declared public policy is going
to work. Each side must consider the needs of the other and both must
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consider the general -welfare. We must not lose sight of the fact
that the solution shall not be easy to find. Our modern, complex
society does not land itself to simple adjustments. Intelligent
leadership on both sides and a patient public will help considerably*
Unions and management must accept the responsibility for the general
welfare. Management should apply the same high degree of skill it
uses in producing goods to its labor relations. Otherwise, the public
policy, as declared, will be changed; and there is no assurance which
side will suffer the most.
This public policy, favoring legislation for the benefit of
the working class, has become a national labor policy. It represents
an institution that must be recognized, not only on a local level but
also on a national level. It represents a new dynamic force in our
social structure. The way we handle it will be of major importance to
the future welfare of the country. It is best described as follows:
”For several years now we have had a
national labor policy. Its elements are well-known.
They are the encouragement of union organization
and collective bargaining through trade unions
and the regulation of wages and hours. An
impressive succession of laws, from the National
Industrial Recovery Act to the Labor Relations
Act, has been enacted to bring labor relations and
working conditions under a greater measure of
control. . .
.
"The purposes of this labor policy are
manifold and explicit. They are intended to raise
and stabilize the purchasing power of labor.
Through the regulation of the hours of work they
are directed toward minimizing the volume of
unemployment. They contemplate the redi stribution
of wealth and income and the achievement of
democracy in the conduct of economic affairs. And
they have as their more ambitious goal the stabili-
zation of business activity, employment, and labor
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income. For, as the preamble to the Wagner
Labor Relations Act asserts, the existence of
unorganized labor, weak in bargaining power,
'tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries.'
"Elaborate as this body of labor law is,
it has not languished on the Statute books, forgotten
by both its authors and beneficiaries. The new
administrative agencies have on the vhole been
managed by men who have shown deep and abiding
faith in the wisdom and efficacy of the policy
they were chosen to interpret. Policy and
legislation have received superb elucidation and
strong endorsement. Transgressors and opponents
have been held up to public odium. Special
problems, such as the instability of the
bituminous coal industry or the control of labor
conditions in the filling of government contracts,
have been made the subject of special legislation.
Organized labor, the chief and most effective agent
of enforcement, has profited from friendly
legislation and administration and has added vastly
to its economic and political power. Its enhanced
power the union movement has used to further the
aims of our national labor policy by demanding a
shorter work week and higher rates of wages, and,
perhaps most important of all, a voice in the
determination of conditions of work." 1/
E. Organized Labor as a Political and Economic Power
I do not believe it is too much to say that organized labor
may be the government of tomorrow in the United States. All we need
do is witness what is happening to the rest of the world. So long as
countries retain the democratic process of acceding to the wish of the
majority vote, then it is highly probable that organized labor through-
out the world will be in the seat of the government or at least have a
An address by Professor Leo Wolman of Columbia University before the
13th New England Conference, Boston, Mass., November 19, 1937,
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major voice therein.
There is no blinking the historical changes that are taking
place. Labor governments are present-day realities and, apparently,
they represent the wave of the immediate future. It doesn’t seem
conceivable that we shall ever return to the time when the employer had
complete and arbitrary powers over the fate of his employees.
The economic power of unions is a well-known fact. In recent
years major strikes paralyzed the whole country. As for the political
power of unions, though it has not been felt too much in the recent
past, it is apparent to any student of political history that an
organized group such as the unions, representing a large bulk of the
American votes, cannot be ignored by a politician who seeks to
procure an office or to retain the one he has.
"The rise of unions constitutes an
epoch-making change in the economy. Unions are no
longer simply organizations which put workers in a
moderately-better bargaining position in dealing
with employers. They are seats of great power —
of the greatest private economic power in the
community. Their policies from now on will be a
major determinant of the prosperity of the country.” 1/
1/ The Challenge of Industrial Relations by Sumner H. Slichter, 1947,
Page V, Preface.
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